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ABSTRACT 
 
The convenience and low cost of 802.11-based Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) 
complemented with 802.1 X authentication has led to widespread deployment in the consumer, 
industrial and military sectors. The combination of wireless signals radiating further than the 
intended coverage area, flaws in 802.11’s basic security mechanisms and vulnerabilities found in 
802.1 X have been widely publicized. Military bases and navy ships are open targets for wireless 
attacks. 
 
Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS), provides an additional (external) layer of security 
by combining intrusion detection, fire walling, packet filtering and determining the physical 
location of the intruder. 
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In today’s fast changing world, management of information and communication infrastructure goes hand-
in-hand. There has been tremendous growth in WLAN usage, a growth that is compared by many to be 
almost as that of the internet in the 90s. 
 
The key factors driving this growth have been decreasing costs, increasing speeds and the general 
convenience of not having to run wires and not being limited to fixed network Access Points (APs). While 
WLANs are not likely to replace all wired Local Area Networks (LANs) any time soon (if ever), the two 
are already beginning to coexist almost seamlessly in several environments.  
 
Another key factor in the growth of WLAN usage is the standardization of protocols and equipment. Access 
to a wired LAN is governed by access to an Ethernet port for that LAN. Therefore, access control for a 
wired LAN often is viewed in terms of physical access to LAN ports. Similarly, because data transmitted on 
a wired LAN is directed to a particular destination, privacy cannot be compromised unless someone uses 
specialized equipment to intercept transmissions on their way to their destination. In short, a security breach 
on a wired LAN is possible only if the LAN is physically compromised.  
 
With a WLAN, transmitted data is broadcast over the air using Radio Frequency (RF) waves. Thus it can be 
received by any WLAN station (STA) in the area served by the data transmitter. Because RF waves travel 
through ceilings, floors, and walls, transmitted data may reach unintended recipients on different floors and 
even outside the building of the transmitter. Similarly, data privacy is a genuine concern with WLANs 
because there is no way to direct a WLAN transmission to only one recipient. 
 
Security in the IEEE 802.11 standard has come under intense scrutiny. Researchers have exposed several 
vulnerabilities in the authentication, data-privacy, and message-integrity mechanisms defined in the 
standard. The 802.11 standard specifies Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), a link-layer security protocol. 
WEP is based on the RC4 stream cipher, a symmetric cipher (the same key is used for both encryption and 
decryption). These security mechanisms, intended to maintain the confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of wireless communications are problematic. Several WEP flaws have been widely documented [3, 5, 6]. 
Each of these flaws allows passive or active attacks on wireless transmissions, by which attackers can 
decrypt information or inject forged information into the transmissions. 
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A lot has been written by various researchers in the past few years about the insecurity of wireless networks 
set up using 802.11 and 802.1 X standards. This paper presents an extension to a Wireless Intrusion 
Detection System (WIDS) designed to provide additional security not available in other intrusion detection 
systems. 
 
WIDS provides an external layer of security around the perimeter of a wireless network and tracks and 
locates potential intruders using directional antennas before they connect to the internal network. The WIDS 
Access Points (APs) are special access points that operate on two wireless Network Interface Card (NIC) 
cards. One NIC functions in Master or HostAP [17] mode and the other NIC functions in Radio Frequency 
(RF) Monitor mode. The NIC running in HostAP mode intrudes stations, denies access, ignores frames and 
reacts promptly to applicable alerts. The NIC running in RF Monitor mode performs the function of passive 
scanning. It can monitor all frames in real time and also detect external/rogue access points. This feature of 
WIDS will extend its applicability not only on 802.11 [1] and 802.1 X [2] networks but also on 802.11 i [3] 
networks. 
 
The WIDS APs report all findings to the Controller, which is connected to all WIDS APs through a wired 
connection. The Controller shows statistics of all WIDS APs, logs data and uses information from two or 
more WIDS APs to locate attackers. The advantage of WIDS over other wireless intrusion detection 
systems is that WIDS is an always live and active intrusion detection system. WIDS can actively respond to 
various threats and can track and locate potential attackers. WIDS can also detect, track and locate rogue 
external access points. 
 
The following chapters present sections on IEEE 802.11 standard [1], security vulnerabilities, problems and 
attacks on IEEE 802.11 b networks, an introduction of IEEE 802.1 X  [2], Extensible Authentication 
Protocol (EAP) [20], implementation of 802.1 X over 802.11, 802.1 X vulnerabilities, introduction to 
intrusion detection, tracking and location techniques, a detailed description of WIDS, an extension of WIDS 
AP implementation by using two NICs, one running (HostAP [17] mode and other running RF Monitor 
mode), defense mechanisms of WIDS and evaluation and testing of WIDS. The paper ends with a 
conclusion and suggestions for future work. 
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Chapter 2. BACKGROUND OF IEEE 802.11 
 
2.1. IEEE 802.11 History 
 
The IEEE 802.11 [1] was designed to support medium-range, higher data rate applications, such as Ethernet 
networks, and to address mobile and portable STAs. 802.11 is the original WLAN standard, designed for 1 
Mbps to 2 Mbps wireless transmissions. It was followed in 1999 by 802.11a, which established a high-
speed WLAN standard for the 5 GHz band and supported 54 Mbps. Also completed in 1999 was the 
802.11b standard, which operates in the 2.4 - 2.48 GHz band and supports 11 Mbps.  
 
The 802.11b standard is currently the dominant standard for WLANs and has been widely adopted. The 
802.11 specifies a security protocol called WEP, which is a RC4 stream cipher. Another standard, 802.11g, 
operates in the 2.4 GHz waveband, where current WLAN products based on the 802.11b standard operate.  
 
Two other important and related standards for WLANs are 802.1 X [2] and 802.11 i [3]. The 802.1 X, a 
port-level access control protocol, provides a security framework for IEEE networks, including Ethernet 
and WLANs. The 802.11 i standard, also still in draft, was created for wireless-specific security functions 
that operate with IEEE 802.1 X.  
 
2.2. IEEE 802.11 Layers  
 
2.2.1. Physical (PHY) Layer 
 
The three physical layers originally defined in 802.11 included two spread-spectrum radio techniques and a 
diffuse infrared specification. The radio-based standards operate within the 2.4 GHz ISM band. The original 
802.11 wireless standard defines data rates of 1 Mbps and 2 Mbps via radio waves using Frequency 
Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) or Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS). 
 
Using the frequency hopping technique, the 2.4 GHz band is divided into 75 one-MHz sub channels. The 
sender and receiver agree on a hopping pattern, and data is sent over a sequence of the sub channels. Each 
conversation within the 802.11 network occurs over a different hopping pattern, and the patterns are 
designed to minimize the chance of two senders using the same sub channel simultaneously. 
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FHSS techniques allow for a relatively simple radio design, but are limited to speeds of no higher than 2 
Mbps. This limitation is driven primarily by FCC regulations that restrict sub channel bandwidth to 1 MHz. 
These regulations force FHSS systems to spread their usage across the entire 2.4 GHz band, meaning they 
must hop often, which leads to a high amount of hopping overhead. 
 
In contrast, DSSS divides the 2.4 GHz band into 14 twenty-two MHz channels. Adjacent channels overlap 
one another partially, with 3 of the 14 being completely non-overlapping. Data is sent across one of these 
22 MHz channels without hopping to other channels. To compensate for noise on a given channel, a 
technique called chipping is used. Each bit of user data is converted into a series of redundant bit patterns 
called chips. The inherent redundancy of each chip combined with spreading the signal across the 22 MHz 
channel provides for a form of error checking and correction even if part of the signal is damaged, it can 
still be recovered in many cases, minimizing the need for retransmissions. The 802.11b standard uses just 
DSSS as the sole physical layer technique. 
 
2.2.2. Data Link (DATA) Layer 
 
The data link layer within 802.11 consists of two sub layers: Logical Link Control (LLC) and Media Access 
Control (MAC). 802.11 uses the same 802.2 LLC and 48-bit addressing as other 802 LANs, allowing for 
very simple bridging from wireless to IEEE wired networks, but the MAC is unique to WLANs. 
 
The 802.11 standard specifies a common MAC Layer, which provides a variety of functions that support 
the operation of 802.11-based WLANs. In general, the MAC Layer manages and maintains 
communications between 802.11 STAs (wireless NICs and APs) by coordinating access to a shared channel 
and utilizing protocols that enhance communications over a wireless medium. 
 
Before transmitting frames, a STA must first gain access to the medium, which is a channel that STAs 
share. The 802.11 standard defines two forms of medium access, Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) 
and Point Coordination Function (PCF). DCF is mandatory and based on the Carrier Sense Multiple Access 
with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) protocol. With DCF, 802.11 STAs contend for access and attempt to 
send frames when there is no other STA transmitting. If another STA is sending a frame, STAs wait until 
the channel is free. 
 
As a condition to accessing the medium, the MAC Layer checks the value of its Network Allocation Vector 
(NAV), which is a counter at each STA that represents the amount of time that the previous STA needs to 
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send its frame. The NAV must be zero before a STA can attempt to send a frame. Prior to transmitting a 
frame, a STA calculates the amount of time necessary to send the frame based on the frame's length and 
data rate. The STA places a value representing this time in the duration field in the header of the frame. 
When STAs receive the frame, they examine this duration field value and use it as the basis for setting their 
corresponding NAVs. This process reserves the medium for the sending STA.  
 
An important aspect of the DCF is a random back off timer that a STA uses if it detects a busy medium. If 
the channel is in use, the STA must wait a random period of time before attempting to access the medium 
again. This helps to ensure that multiple STAs wanting to send data do not transmit at the same time. The 
random delay causes STAs to wait different periods of time and avoids all of them sensing the medium at 
exactly the same time, finding the channel idle, transmitting, and colliding with each other. The back off 
timer significantly reduces the number of collisions and corresponding retransmissions, especially when the 
number of active users increases. 
 
With WLANs, a transmitting STA can not listen for collisions while sending data, mainly because the STA 
can not have it's receiver ON while transmitting the frame. As a result, the receiving STA needs to send an 
Acknowledgement (ACK) if it detects no errors in the received frame. If the sending STA doesn't receive an 
ACK after a specified period of time, the sending STA will assume that there was a collision (or RF 
interference) and retransmits the frame. 
 
For supporting time-bounded delivery of data frames, the 802.11 standard defines PCF where the AP grants 
access to an individual STA to the medium by polling the STA during the contention free period. STAs 
can't transmit frames unless the AP polls them first. The period of time for PCF-based data traffic (if 
enabled) occurs alternately between contention (DCF) periods. 
 
The AP polls STAs according to a polling list and then switches to a contention period when STAs use 
DCF. This process enables support for both synchronous (i.e., video applications) and asynchronous (i.e., e-
mail and Web browsing applications) modes of operation. 
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2.2.3. MAC Layer Functions 
 
2.2.3.1. Scanning 
 
The 802.11 standard defines both Passive and Active scanning whereby, a wireless NIC searches for APs. 
Passive scanning is mandatory where each NIC scans individual channels to find the best AP signal. 
Periodically, APs broadcast a beacon, and the wireless NIC receives these beacons while scanning and takes 
note of the corresponding signal strengths. The beacons contain information about the AP, including 
Service Set IDentifier (SSID), supported data rates, etc. The wireless NIC can use this information along 
with the signal strength to compare APs and decide upon which one to use. 
 
Optional active scanning is similar, except the wireless NIC initiates the process by broadcasting a probe 
frame and all APs within range respond with a probe response. Active scanning enables a wireless NIC to 
receive immediate response from APs, without waiting for a beacon transmission. The issue, however, is 
that active scanning imposes additional overhead on the network because of the transmission of probe and 
corresponding response frames. 
 
2.2.3.2. Authentication 
 
Authentication is the process of proving identity, and the basic 802.11 standard specifies two forms: Open 
system authentication and shared key authentication (Refer Figure. 1). 
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Figure 1: 802.11 Authentication 
 
Open system authentication is mandatory, and it's a two step process. A wireless NIC first initiates the 
process by sending an authentication request frame to the AP. The AP replies with an authentication 
response frame containing approval or disapproval of authentication indicated in the Status Code field in the 
frame body. 
 
Shared key authentication is an optional four step process that checks whether the authenticating device has 
the correct WEP key. The wireless NIC starts by sending an authentication request frame to the AP. The AP 
then places challenge text into the frame body of a response frame and sends it to the wireless NIC. The 
wireless NIC uses its WEP key to encrypt the challenge text and then sends it back to the AP in another 
authentication frame. The AP decrypts the challenge text and compares it to the initial text. If the text is 
equivalent, then the AP assumes that the wireless NIC has the correct key. The AP finishes the sequence by 
sending an authentication frame to the wireless NIC with the approval or disapproval. 
 
2.2.3.3. Association 
 
Once authenticated, the wireless NIC must associate with the AP before sending data frames. Association is 
necessary to synchronize the wireless NIC and AP with important information, such as supported data rates. 
The wireless NIC initiates the association by sending an association request frame containing elements such 
as SSID and supported data rates. The AP responds by sending an association response frame containing an 
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association ID along with other information regarding the AP. Once the wireless NIC and AP complete the 
association process, they can send data frames to each other. 
 
 
2.2.3.4. Request-To-Send (RTS) /Clear-To-Send (CTS) 
 
The optional RTS/CTS function allows the AP to control use of the medium for STAs activating RTS/CTS. 
With most wireless NICs, users can set a maximum frame length threshold whereby the wireless NIC will 
activate RTS/CTS. For example, a frame length of 2 Kb will trigger RTS/CTS for all frames larger than 2 
Kb. The use of RTS/CTS alleviates hidden node problems, that is, where two or more wireless NICs can't 
hear each other and they are associated with the same AP. 
 
If the wireless NIC activates RTS/CTS, it will first send a RTS frame to AP before sending a data frame. 
The AP will then respond with a CTS frame, indicating that the wireless NIC can send the data frame. With 
the CTS frame, the AP will provide a value in the duration field of the frame header that holds off other 
STAs from transmitting until after the wireless NIC initiating the RTS can send its data frame. This avoids 
collisions between hidden nodes. The RTS/CTS handshake continues for each frame, as long as the frame 
size exceeds the threshold set in the corresponding wireless NIC. 
 
2.2.3.5. Power Save Mode 
 
The optional power save mode enables the wireless NIC to conserve battery power when there is no 
need to send data. With power save mode ON, the wireless NIC indicates its desire to enter sleep state to 
the AP via a status bit located in the header of each frame. The AP takes note of each wireless NIC wishing 
to enter power save mode and buffers packets corresponding to the sleeping STA. 
 
In order to still receive data frames, the sleeping NIC must wake up periodically (at the right time) to 
receive regular beacon transmissions coming from the AP. These beacons identify whether sleeping STAs 
have frames buffered at the AP and waiting for delivery to their respective destinations. The wireless NICs 
having awaiting frames will request them from the AP. After receiving the frames, the wireless NIC can go 
back to sleep. 
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2.2.3.6. Fragmentation 
 
The optional fragmentation function enables an 802.11 STA to divide data packets into smaller frames. This 
is done to avoid the need to retransmit large frames in the presence of RF interference. The bit errors 
resulting from RF interference are likely to affect a single frame, and it requires less overhead to retransmit 
a smaller frame rather than a larger one. As with RTS/CTS, users can generally set a maximum frame 
length threshold whereby the wireless NIC will activate fragmentation. If the frame size is larger than the 
threshold, the wireless NIC will break the packet into multiple frames, with each frame no larger than the 
threshold value. 
 
2.3. IEEE 802.11 Frame Types 
 
The 802.11 standard defines various frame types that STAs and APs use for communication, as well as 
managing and controlling the wireless link. Every frame has a control field that depicts the 802.11 protocol 
version, frame type, and various indicators, such as whether WEP is on, power management is active, and 
so on. In addition all frames contain MAC addresses of the source and destination STA (and AP), a frame 
sequence number, frame body and frame check sequence (for error detection). 
 
802.11 data frames carry protocols and data from higher layers within the frame body. Other frames that 
STAs use for management and control carry specific information regarding the wireless link in the frame 
body. For example, a beacon's frame body contains the SSID, timestamp, and other pertinent information 
regarding the AP. 
 
2.3.1. 802.11 Management Frames 
 
802.11 management frames enable STAs to establish and maintain communications. 
The following are common 802.11 management frame subtypes: 
 
Authentication Frame 
802.11 authentication is a process where the AP either accepts or rejects the identity of a wireless NIC. The 
NIC begins the process by sending an authentication frame containing its identity to the AP. With open 
system authentication (the default), the wireless NIC sends only one authentication frame, and the AP 
responds with an authentication frame as a response indicating acceptance (or rejection). With the optional 
shared key authentication, the wireless NIC sends an initial authentication frame, and the AP responds with 
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an authentication frame containing challenge text. The wireless NIC must send an encrypted version of the 
challenge text (using its WEP key) in an authentication frame back to the AP. 
 
The AP ensures that the wireless NIC has the correct WEP key (which is the basis for authentication) by 
seeing whether the challenge text recovered after decryption is the same that was sent previously. Based on 
the results of this comparison, the AP replies to the wireless NIC with an authentication frame. 
 
Deauthentication Frame 
A STA sends a deauthentication frame to an AP if it wishes to terminate secure communications. 
 
Association Request Frame 
An 802.11 association enables the AP to allocate resources for and synchronize with a wireless NIC. A NIC 
begins the association process by sending an association request to an AP. This frame carries information 
about the NIC and the SSID of the network it wishes to associate with. After receiving the association 
request, the AP considers associating with the NIC, and (if accepted) reserves memory space and 
establishes an association ID for the NIC. 
 
Association Response Frame 
An AP sends an association response frame containing an acceptance or rejection notice to the wireless NIC 
requesting association. If the AP accepts the radio NIC, the frame includes information regarding the 
association, such as association ID and supported data rates. If the outcome of the association is positive, 
the wireless NIC can utilize the AP to communicate with other NICs on the network and systems on the 
distribution (i.e., Ethernet) side of the AP. 
 
Reassociation Request Frame 
If a wireless NIC roams away from the currently associated AP and finds another AP having a stronger 
beacon signal, the wireless NIC will send a reassociation frame to the new AP. The new AP then 
coordinates the forwarding of data frames that may still be in the buffer of the previous AP waiting for 
transmission to the wireless NIC. 
 
Reassociation Response Frame 
An AP sends a reassociation response frame containing an acceptance or rejection notice to the wireless 
NIC requesting reassociation. 
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Similar to the association process, the frame includes information regarding the association, such as 
association ID and supported data rates. 
 
Disassociation Frame 
A STA sends a disassociation frame to another STA if it wishes to terminate the association. For example, a 
wireless NIC that is shut down gracefully can send a disassociation frame to alert the AP that the NIC is 
powering off. The AP can then relinquish memory allocations and remove the wireless NIC from the 
association table. 
 
Beacon Frame 
The AP periodically sends a beacon frame to announce its presence and relay information, such as 
timestamp, SSID, and other parameters regarding the AP to wireless NICs that are within range. Wireless 
NICs continually scan all 802.11 radio channels and listen to beacons as the basis for choosing which AP is 
best to associate with. 
 
Probe Request Frame 
A STA sends a probe request frame when it needs to obtain information from another STA. For example, a 
wireless NIC would send a probe request to determine which APs are within range. 
 
Probe response frame 
A STA will respond with a probe response frame, containing capability information, supported data rates, 
etc., when it receives a probe request frame. 
 
2.3.2. 802.11 Control Frames 
 
802.11 control frames assist in the delivery of data frames between STAs. The following are common 
802.11 control frame subtypes: 
 
RTS Frame 
The RTS/CTS function is optional and reduces frame collisions present when hidden STAs have 
associations with the same AP. A STA sends a RTS frame to another STA as the first phase of a two-way 
handshake necessary before sending a data frame. 
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CTS Frame 
A STA responds to a RTS with a CTS frame, providing clearance for the requesting STA to send a data 
frame. The CTS includes a time value that causes all other STAs (including hidden STAs) to hold off 
transmission of frames for a time period necessary for the requesting STA to send its frame. This minimizes 
collisions among hidden STAs, which can result in higher throughput if implemented properly. 
 
ACK Frame 
After receiving a data frame, the receiving STA will utilize an error checking processes to detect the 
presence of errors. The receiving STA will send an ACK frame to the sending STA if no errors are found. If 
the sending STA doesn't receive an ACK after a period of time, the sending STA will retransmit the frame. 
 
A point worth noting is that RTS, CTS and ACK frames are not authenticated in the 802.11 standard. 
 
 
2.3.3. 802.11 Data Frames 
 
The main purpose of having a WLAN is to transport data. IEEE 802.11 defines a data frame type that 
carries packets from higher layers, such as web pages, printer control data, etc., within the body of the 
frame. 
 
2.4. IEEE 802.11 Task Group i (TGi) 
 
The IEEE is currently working on three separate initiatives for improving WLAN security. The first 
involves the IEEE 802.11 Task Group i (TGi) which has proposed significant modifications to the existing 
IEEE 802.11 standard as a long-term solution for security. The TGi is defining additional ciphers based on 
the newly released Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The AES based solution will provide a highly 
robust solution for the future but will require new hardware and protocol changes. TGi currently has design 
requirements to address many of the known problems with WEP including the prevention of forgeries and 
detection of replay attacks. 
 
The second initiative for improving WLAN security is the TGi’s short-term solution WiFi Protected Access 
(WPA) to address the problems of WEP. The group is defining the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) 
to address the problems without requiring hardware changes that is, requiring only changes to firmware and 
software drivers. The third initiative from IEEE is the introduction of a new standard, IEEE 802.1 X-2001, a 
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generic framework for port-based network access control and key distribution, approved in June 2001.  
 
By defining the encapsulation of EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) [20] over IEEE 802 media, 
IEEE 802.1 X enables an AP and STA to mutually authenticate one another. Since IEEE 802.1 X was 
developed primarily for use with IEEE 802 LANs, not for use with WLANS, the IEEE 802.11 i draft 
standard defines additional capabilities required for secure implementation of IEEE 802.1 X on 802.11 
networks. These include a requirement for use of an EAP method supporting mutual authentication, key 
management, and dictionary attack resistance. In addition, 802.11 i defines the hierarchy for use with the 
TKIP and AES ciphers and a four way key management handshake used to ensure that the STA is 
authenticated to the AP and a back-end authentication server. 
 
2.5. IEEE 802.11 Security Vulnerabilities 
 
IEEE 802.11 provides for security via two methods, which are authentication and encryption. The 802.11 
standard provides for both MAC layer access control and encryption mechanisms, which is known as WEP, 
with the objective of providing WLANs with security equivalent to their wired counterparts. For the access 
control, the WLAN Service Area ID (ESSID) is programmed into each AP and is required knowledge in 
order for a STA to associate with an AP. In addition, there is provision for a table of MAC addresses called 
an Access Control List (ACL) to be included in the AP, restricting access to clients whose MAC addresses 
are on the list. For data encryption, the standard provides for optional encryption using a RC4 stream 
cipher. All data sent and received while the end STA and AP are associated can be encrypted using a shared 
key. In addition, when encryption is in use, the AP will issue an encrypted challenge packet to any client 
attempting to associate with it. The client must use its key to encrypt the correct response in order to 
authenticate itself and gain network access. 
 
Security problems with WEP include the following [29]: 
 
1. The use of static WEP keys—many users in a WLAN potentially sharing the identical key for long 
periods of time, is a well-known security vulnerability. This is in part due to the lack of any key 
management provisions in the WEP protocol. If a computer such as a laptop were to be lost or stolen, the 
key could become compromised along with all the other computers sharing that key. Moreover, if every 
STA uses the same key, a large amount of traffic may be rapidly available to an eavesdropper for analytic 
attacks, such as 2 and 3 below. 
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2. The Initialization Vector (IV) in WEP is a 24-bit field sent in the clear text portion of a message. This 24-
bit string, used to initialize the key stream generated by the RC4 algorithm, is a relatively small field when 
used for cryptographic purposes. Reuse of the same IV produces identical key streams for the protection of 
data, and the short IV guarantees that they will repeat after a relatively short time in a busy network. 
Moreover, the 802.11 standard does not specify how the IVs are set or changed, and individual wireless 
NICs from the same vendor may all generate the same IV sequences, or some wireless NICs may possibly 
use a constant IV. As a result, hackers can record network traffic, determine the key stream, and use it to 
decrypt the cipher-text. 
 
3. The IV is a part of the RC4 encryption key. The fact that an eavesdropper knows 24-bits of every packet 
key, combined with a weakness in the RC4 key schedule, leads to a successful analytic attack [6], which 
recovers the key, after intercepting and analyzing only a relatively small amount of traffic. This attack is 
publicly available as an attack script and open source code. Airsnort [11] and WEPCrack [12] perform this 
attack. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recently demonstrated a method to crack the WEP key 
inside three minutes [26]. 
 
4. WEP provides no cryptographic integrity protection. However, the 802.11 MAC protocol uses a non-
cryptographic Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) to check the integrity of packets, and acknowledge packets 
with the correct checksum. The combination of non-cryptographic checksums with stream ciphers is 
dangerous and often introduces vulnerabilities, as is the case for WEP [5]. There is an active attack that 
permits the attacker to decrypt any packet by systematically modifying the packet and CRC sending it to the 
AP and noting whether the packet is acknowledged. These kinds of attacks are often subtle, and it is now 
considered risky to design encryption protocols that do not include cryptographic integrity protection, 
because of the possibility of interactions with other protocol levels that can give away information about 
cipher text. 
 
Note that only one of the four problems listed above depends on a weakness in the cryptographic algorithm. 
Therefore, these problems would not be improved by substituting a stronger stream cipher. For example, the 
third problem listed above is a consequence of a weakness in the implementation of the RC4 stream cipher 
that is exposed by a poorly designed protocol. 
 
 
 
Key Problems with existing 802.11 WLAN Security [27] are as follows: 
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 Security features in products are frequently not enabled. Security features are turned off not in 
802.11 products when shipped, and novice users do not enable security during installation period. 
Bad security is generally better than no security. 
 
IVs are short (or static). 24-bit IVs cause the generated key stream to repeat. Repetition allows 
easy decryption of data for a moderately sophisticated adversary. 
 
Cryptographic keys are short.40-bit keys are inadequate for any system. It is generally accepted 
that key sizes should be greater than 80 bits in length. The longer the key, the less likely it is 
possible to comprise the key from a brute-force attack. 
 
Cryptographic keys are shared. Keys that are shared can compromise a system. As the number of 
people sharing the key grows, the security risks also grow. A fundamental tenant of cryptography 
is that the security of a system is largely dependent on the secrecy of the keys. 
 
Cryptographic keys cannot be updated automatically and frequently. Cryptographic keys should 
be changed often to prevent brute-force attacks. 
 
RC4 has a weak key schedule and is inappropriately used in WEP. The combination of revealing 
24 key bits in the IV and a weakness in the initial few bytes of the RC4 key stream leads to an 
efficient attack that recovers the key. Most other applications of RC4 do not expose the 
weaknesses of RC4 because they do not reveal key bits and do not restart the key schedule for 
every packet. This attack is available to moderately sophisticated adversaries. 
 
Packet integrity is poor. CRC32 and other linear block codes are inadequate for providing 
cryptographic integrity. Message modification is possible. Linear codes are inadequate for the 
protection against advertent attacks on data integrity. Cryptographic protection is required to 
prevent deliberate attacks. Use of non cryptographic protocols often facilitates attacks against the 
cryptography. 
 
No user authentication occurs. Only the device is authenticated. A device that is stolen can access 
the network. 
 
Authentication is not enabled; only simple SSID identification occurs. Identity-based systems are 
highly vulnerable particularly in a wireless system because signals can be more easily intercepted. 
 
Device authentication is simple shared-key challenge-response. One-way challenge-response 
authentication is subject to Man-in-Middle (MIM) attacks. Mutual authentication is required to 
provide verification that users and the network are legitimate. 
 
The client does not authenticate the AP. The client needs to authenticate the AP to ensure that it is 
legitimate and prevent the introduction of rogue APs. 
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Table 1: Problems with existing 802.11 WLAN Security 
 
 
2.6. Attacks on 802.11 Networks 
 
2.6.1. Taxonomy of Attacks 
 
Network security attacks are typically divided into passive and active attacks [27]. These two broad classes 
are then subdivided into other types of attacks. All are defined below (Refer Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Taxonomy of Attacks 
 
 
Passive Attack 
A passive attack can be defined as one which involves an unauthorized user gaining access to a network and 
not modifying or altering the network. Passive attacks can be either eavesdropping or traffic analysis 
(sometimes called traffic flow analysis). These two passive attacks are described below. 
 
 
Eavesdropping 
The attacker monitors transmissions for message content. An example of this attack is a person listening 
into the transmissions on a LAN between two work stations or tuning into transmissions between a STA 
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and an AP. 
 
Traffic Analysis 
The attacker, in a more subtle way, gains intelligence by monitoring the transmissions for patterns of 
communication. A considerable amount of information is contained in the flow of messages between 
communicating parties. 
 
Active Attack 
An active attack can be defined as one which involves an unauthorized user making modifications to a 
message, data stream, or a file. It is possible to detect this type of attack but it may not be preventable. 
Active attacks may take the form of one of four types (or combination thereof): masquerading, replay, 
message modification, and Denial-of-Service. These attacks are defined below. 
 
Masquerading 
The attacker impersonates an authorized user and thereby gains certain unauthorized privileges. 
 
Replay 
The attacker monitors transmissions (passive attack) and retransmits messages as the legitimate user. Using 
a database of valid wireless traffic dumps from sources like Ethereal or Kismet, data can be replayed via 
packet injection. 
 
Message modification 
The attacker alters a legitimate message by deleting, adding to, changing, or reordering it. 
 
Denial-of-Service (DoS) 
The attacker prevents or prohibits the normal use or management of communications facilities. DoS attacks 
happen very frequently in the wired world but this class of attacks in the wireless world is damaging and 
can come from any direction. Microwave ovens, baby monitors, cordless telephones, and other commonly 
available consumer products can give attackers the tools for a simple and extremely damaging DoS attack. 
Unleashing large amounts of noise from these other devices can jam the airwaves and shut down a WLAN. 
Attackers can launch more sophisticated DoS attacks by configuring a station to operate as an AP. As an 
AP, the attacker can flood the airwaves with continuous deauthenticate/disassociate packets that force all 
STAs within range to disconnect from the WLAN. In another variation, the attacker’s malicious AP 
broadcasts periodic deauthenticate/disassociate commands every few minutes that causes a situation where 
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stations are continually kicked off the network, reconnected, and kicked off again.  
 
2.6.2. Malicious Association  
 
The attacker can force unsuspecting STAs to connect to an undesired 802.11 network. As the victim’s STA 
broadcasts a probe to associate with an AP, the attackers new malicious AP responds to the victim’s request 
for association and begins a connection between the two. After providing an IP address to the victim’s 
workstation (if needed), the malicious AP can begin its attacks. The attacker, acting as an AP, can use 
hacking tools that have been tested and proven in a wired environment. At this time, the attacker can exploit 
all vulnerabilities on the victim’s laptop. 
 
The malicious association attack shows that WLANs are subject to diversion and STAs do not always know 
which network or AP they connect to. STAs can be tricked or forced to connect to a malicious AP. Even 
WLANs that have deployed Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) are vulnerable to malicious associations. This 
attack does not try to break the VPN but takes over the client STA.  
 
2.6.3. MAC Spoofing – Identity Theft  
 
Software tools, such as Kismet [24] or Netstumbler [18], are available for attackers to easily pick off the 
MAC addresses of an authorized AP or STA. The attacker can then assume the identity of that AP or STA 
by asserting the stolen MAC address as his own. WLAN intrusion detection systems can also identify when 
a MAC address is spoofed by analyzing the vendor “fingerprints” of the WLAN card where by the IDS can 
see when, as an example, an Orinoco WLAN card connects to the network using MAC address of a Cisco 
WLAN card. (Refer Figure 3) 
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Figure 3: Mac Spoofing 
 
2.6.4. Man-in-Middle (MIM) Attacks  
 
A Man-in-Middle attack can break a secure VPN connection between an authorized STA and an AP. By 
inserting a malicious STA between the victim STA and the AP, the attacker becomes the man-in-middle as 
he tricks the STA into believing he is the AP and tricks the AP into believing he is the authorized STA.  
 
To begin this attack, the attacker passively observes the station as it connects to the AP, and the attacker 
collects the authentication information, including the username, server name, client and server IP address, 
the ID used to compute the response, and the challenge and associate response. (Refer Figure 4)  
 
 
Figure 4: VPN Attack 
 
The attacker then tries to associate with the AP by sending a request that appears to be coming from the 
authenticated STA. The AP sends the VPN challenge to the authenticated station, which computes the 
required authentic response, and sends the response to the AP. The attacker observes the valid response. 
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(Refer Figure 5)  
 
 
Figure 5: VPN Assault 
 
The attacker then acts as the AP in presenting a challenge to the authorized STA. The STA computes the 
appropriate response, which is sent to the AP. The AP then sends the STA a success packet with an 
imbedded sequence number. Both are captured by the attacker. After capturing all this data, the attacker 
then has what he needs to complete the attack and defeat the VPN. The attacker sends a spoofed reply with 
large sequence number, which bumps the victim’s station off the network and keeps it from re-associating. 
The attacker then enters the network as the authorized station.  
 
2.6.5. Power Saving Vulnerabilities [8] 
 
The Power Save mode in 802.11 allows STAs to enter into a sleep state during which they are unable to 
transmit or receive. Before entering the sleep state the STA sends its intention to the AP so that the AP can 
start buffering any inbound traffic. Periodically the STA polls the AP for any pending traffic. If there is any 
buffered data at this time, the AP delivers it and subsequently discards the contents of its buffer. By 
spoofing the polling message on behalf of the STA, an attacker may cause the AP to discard the STA’s 
packets while it is asleep. It is also potentially possible to trick the STA node into thinking there are no 
buffered packets at the AP when in fact there are. The presence of buffered packets is indicated in a 
periodically broadcast packet called the Traffic Indication Map (TIM). If the TIM message itself is spoofed, 
an attacker may convince a STA that there is no pending data for it and the STA will immediately revert 
back to the sleep state. The power saving mechanism relies on time synchronization between the AP and its 
STAs so the STAs know when to awake. Key synchronization information, such as the period of TIM 
packets and a timestamp broadcast by the AP, are sent unauthenticated and in the clear. By forging these 
management packets, an attacker can cause a STA node to fall out of sync with the AP and fail to wake up 
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at the appropriate times. 
 
 
2.6.6. Virtual Carrier Sense Attack [8] 
 
The virtual carrier sense mechanism is used to mitigate collisions. Each 802.11 frame carries a duration 
field that indicates the number of microseconds that the channel is reserved. The duration field is used to 
program the Network Allocation Vector (NAV) on each node. Only when a node’s NAV is zero is it 
allowed to transmit. This feature is used by RTS and CTS handshake that can be used to synchronize. 
 
During the handshake the sending node sends a small RTS frame that includes the duration large enough to 
complete the RTS/CTS sequence, including the STS frame, the data frame and ACK frame. An attacker 
may assert a large duration field value preventing other STAs access to the channel. The maximum value of 
the NAV is 32767, approximately 32 milliseconds, so an attacker need only transmit 30 times in a second to 
jam all access to the channel. 
 
2.6.7. PLME_DSSSTESTMODE (Jamming) Attack [13] 
 
This is a PHY layer attack. It exploits a test mode in the IEEE 802.11b DSSS specification. It takes 
advantage of a test mode (PLME_DSSSTESTMODE) of operation present in 802.11b WLAN adapters 
(PCMCIA Cards/ APs) to continuously transmit a DSSS signal on a target channel. This continuous 
transmission effects all stations within range of the attacker (whether STAs or APs) using the target 
channel, resulting in the CSMA/CA reporting the media as busy for the duration of the attack.  
The impact of this is that no station within range of the attacker will be able to seize the media for 
transmission, resulting in DoS of the target channel. 
The flaws in 802.11’s basic security mechanisms and vulnerabilities of 802.11 to the various above 
mentioned attacks have initiated the IEEE to propose 802.1 X as one of the initiatives to further secure 
802.11 WLANs. 
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Chapter 3. BACKGROUND OF IEEE 802.1 X 
 
3.1. What is IEEE 802.1 X? 
 
Researchers have demonstrated basic flaws in 802.11 encryption mechanism and authentication protocols, 
which has led IEEE to create a series of protocol extensions and replacements. The IEEE 802.1 X standard 
defines a port-based network access control. It can be based on Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) 
[2], which provides a wide variety of authentication mechanisms. The access control is performed at the 
MAC level (it is PHY independent). 802.1 X provides network access control through the concept of a port. 
A port is any kind of controlled access, for example a router, switch or modem line for dial-up. 802.1 X was 
not initially designed for WLANs. The IEEE defines a virtual port as an association between a STA and an 
AP. To associate with an AP, the STA has to authenticate first (802.11 authentication). Once associated 
with a specific AP, the STA can go through 802.1 X authentication. 802.1 X provides per-station, per-
session keys, and causes these keys to be changed often, solving reuse issues. 
 
The 802.1 X framework provides the link layer with extensible authentication, normally seen in higher 
layers (Refer Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: 802.1 X Layers 
 
802.1 X requires two entities: 
• The supplicant, which resides on the wireless STA 
• The authenticator, which resides on the AP  
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The authentication server (optional) resides on the RADIUS (discussed in Section 3.2) server. 
These entities are logical entities on the network devices. The authenticator creates a logical port per client, 
based on the client's Association ID (AID). This logical port has two data paths. The uncontrolled data path 
allows network traffic through to the network. The controlled data path requires successful authentication to 
allow network traffic through (Refer Figure 7). 
 
  
Figure 7: 802.1 X Ports 
 
The supplicant becomes active on the medium and associates to the AP. The authenticator detects the client 
association and enables the supplicant's port. It forces the port into an unauthorized state so that only 802.1 
X traffic is forwarded. All other traffic is blocked. The client may send an EAP Start message, although 
client initiation is not required (Refer Figure 8). 
The authenticator replies with an EAP Request Identity message back to the supplicant to obtain the client's 
identity. The supplicant's EAP Response packet containing the client's identity is forwarded to the 
authentication server. 
The authentication server is configured to authenticate clients with a specific authentication algorithm. 
Currently, 802.1 X for 802.11 LANs does not stipulate a specific algorithm to use thus allowing a variety of 
authentication algorithms to operate over it. 
The end result is a RADIUS -ACCEPT or RADIUS-REJECT packet from the RADIUS server to the AP. 
Upon receiving the RADIUS ACCEPT packet, the authenticator transitions the client's port to an authorized 
state, and traffic may be forwarded. 
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 Figure 8: 802.1 X and EAP Message Flow 
 
IEEE 802.1 X can be implemented entirely on the AP (by providing support for one or more EAP methods 
within the AP), or it can utilize a backend authentication server. The IEEE 802.1 X standard supports 
authentication protocols such as RADIUS, Diameter, and Kerberos. RADIUS [21] enables authentication, 
authorization, and accounting for Network Access Server (NAS) devices, including dial-up, xDSL, and 
802.11. The 802.1 X standard can be implemented with different EAP types, including EAP-MD5 [20] 
(supports only one-way authentication without key exchange) for Ethernet LANs and EAP-TLS [22] 
(supports fast reconnect, mutual authentication and key management via certificate authentication). 
Currently new generations of EAP methods are being developed within the IETF, focused on addressing 
wireless authentication and key management issues. These methods support additional security features 
such as cryptographic protection of the EAP conversation, identity protection, secure ciphersuite 
negotiation, tunneling of other EAP methods, etc. 
 
The use of EAP and RADIUS along with 802.1 X provides a user-based identification, a choice of 
authentication methods and a centralized user management as well as a dynamic key management. EAP and 
RADIUS are described in more detail later in this chapter. 
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3.2. RADIUS 
 
RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service) [21] has been widely used by business and Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) to control remote access. 
 
A RADIUS client is a type of network access server (NAS), in our case this is an AP, and sends 
authentication and accounting requests to the RADIUS server (authentication server) in order to gain 
network access. Communications between the RADIUS server and the RADIUS client are authenticated 
through a shared secret. Each AP has its own shared secret with the RADIUS server. In general the 
transport protocol used is UDP and the RADIUS server listens on the port. 
 
RADIUS supports a variety of authentication protocols like Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol 
(CHAP), Microsoft Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (MS-CHAP) and EAP. The main 
advantage of EAP is that it supports different methods of authentication. The choice of EAP method is 
negotiated by the client and RADIUS server during the authentication phase. 
 
3.3. EAP 
 
EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) [20] is essentially a transport protocol. Its main advantage is that 
it provides an authentication framework and can be used by a variety of different authentication types 
known as EAP methods. It is supposed to head off proprietary authentication systems. It is designed to 
allow authentication methods to be deployed with no changes to the AP. EAP is used to pass the 
authentication information between the supplicant and the authentication server. The choice of 
authentication type is defined by the EAP type. The software supporting the EAP type resides on the 
authentication server and within the operating system of the client. The AP can be seen as a bridge between 
the supplicant and the authentication server. One of the goals of EAP is to enable development of new 
authentication methods without modifying the AP. One of the key points of 802.1 X is that the authenticator 
can be simple and dumb, all of the brains have to be in the supplicant and the authentication server. This 
makes 802.1 X ideal for wireless APs, which typically have little memory and processing power. Since the 
authentication mechanism is independent of the AP, we can specify any EAP methods without updating 
APs. 
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 3.3.1. Overview of EAP Packets 
 
EAP exchanges are composed of requests and responses. The authenticator (AP) sends requests to the 
supplicant (wireless STA that wants to access the network). The supplicant responds. Based on the 
credentials of the supplicant, the access will be granted or denied. There are two kinds of EAP packets 
(Refer Figure 9): 
• EAP request and response 
• EAP success and failure 
The Data Type carried by the EAP request and response packets can be: 
Data-type 1: The ID of the supplicant 
Data-type 2: Notification: used to provide messages to the user 
Data-type 3: NAK: used to suggest another authentication method 
Data-type: 4-13 Kind of authentication type (EAP-MD5, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS, EAP-PEAP, LEAP etc...). 
 
At the end of the EAP exchange, the authenticator grants access or not to the network. The EAP success and 
failure packets do not contain data. It only specifies if the user has been authenticated or not following the 
requests and responses. The Data Type carried by the EAP success and failure packets are either Data Type 
3 in case of a success and Data Type 4 in case of a failure. 
 
NAK is used to suggest another authentication method. That is the client and RADIUS server negotiate the 
choice of authentication during the authentication phase. Figure 10 shows a typical EAP exchange. 
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Figure 9: Kind of EAP Packets 
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Figure 10: A typical EAP exchange 
 
The protocol used between the supplicant and the AP is EAPOL. It is an encapsulation of EAP and it 
provides start messages, session logoff notification and key negotiation. 
 
3.3.2. Choice of EAP methods 
 
A common way of EAP authentication is certificates. Many EAP methods use certificates. The next section 
will describe what a certificate is and how a client can verify the certificate of the server. 
 
Some EAP methods based on public-key certificates and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol: EAP-
TLS, EAP-TTLS, and Protected EAP (PEAP). 
 
3.3.2.1. EAP-TLS 
 
It provides mutual authentication since both the client and the server use digital certificates signed by a 
certificate authority. It can provide user-based and session based WEP keys to encrypt the communication 
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channel between the client and the AP. This is a very secure authentication method. The certificates can be 
replaced by smart cards thus authenticating the user instead of the device. However, it requires all the user 
devices to have certificates. So, the cost of administration is high. 
 
EAP-TLS is based on SSL v3.0. TLS is designed to provide secure authentication and encryption for a 
TCP/IP connection. To provide this functionality, TLS comprises three protocols: 
• Handshake protocol: The handshake protocol negotiates the parameters for the SSL session. The 
SSL client and server negotiate the protocol version, encryption algorithms, authenticate each 
another, and derive encryption keys.  
• Record protocol: The record protocol facilitates encrypted exchanges between the SSL client and 
the server. The negotiated encryption scheme and encryption keys are used to provide a secure 
tunnel for application data between the SSL endpoints.  
• Alert protocol: The alert protocol is the mechanism used to notify the SSL client or server of errors 
as well as session termination.  
TLS authentication is generally split into two methods: server-side authentication and client-side 
authentication. Server-side authentication uses public key infrastructure (PKI), namely PKI certificates. 
Client-side authentication can also use PKI certificates, but this is optional. EAP-TLS uses client-side 
certificates. 
3.3.2.2. PKI and Digital Certificates 
PKI encryption is based on asymmetric encryption keys. A PKI user has two keys: a public key and a 
private key. Any data encrypted with the public key can be decrypted only with the private key, and vice 
versa. For example: Mr. X gives Ms. Y his public key. Ms. Y then sends Mr. X an e-mail encrypted with his 
public key. For Mr. X to read the message, he has to decrypt the message with his private key. Because Mr. 
X is the only person with access to his private key, only he can decrypt the message (Refer Figure 11). 
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Figure 11: Public Key Encryption 
 
Digital certificates are data structures distributed by a certificate authority that join a public key to a user. A 
digital certificate is generally made up of the following pieces of information: 
• Certificate version  
• Serial number  
• Certificate issuer  
• User  
• User's public key  
• Validity period  
• Optional extensions  
• Signature algorithm  
• Signature  
The digital signature is derived by combining the certificate version, serial number, issuer, user, user's 
public key, and validity period and running the values through a keyed hash function. The certificate 
authority keys the hash with its own private key (Refer Figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 12: Digital Signature 
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3.3.2.3. TLS Authentication Process 
The TLS process begins with the handshake process: 
1. The SSL client connects to a server and makes an authentication request 
2. The server sends its digital certificate to the client 
3. The client verifies the certificate's validity and digital signature 
4. The server requests client-side authentication 
5. The client sends its digital certificate to the server 
6. The server verifies the certificate's validity and digital signature 
7. The encryption and message integrity schemes are negotiated 
8. Application data is sent over the encrypted tunnel via the record protocol 
3.3.2.4. EAP-TLS Authentication Process 
The EAP-TLS authentication process is as follows (Refer Figure 13): 
1. The client sends an EAP Start message to the AP 
2. The AP replies with an EAP Request Identity message 
3. The client sends its Network Access Identifier (NAI), which is its username, to the AP in an EAP 
Response message 
4. The AP forwards the NAI to the RADIUS server encapsulated in a RADIUS Access Request message 
5. The RADIUS server will respond to the client with its digital certificate 
6. The client will validate the RADIUS server's digital certificate 
7. The client will reply to the RADIUS server with its digital certificate 
8. The RADIUS server will validate the client's credentials against the client digital certificate 
9. The client and RADIUS server derive encryption keys 
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10. The RADIUS server sends the AP a RADIUS ACCEPT message, including the client's WEP key, 
indicating successful authentication 
11. The AP sends the client an EAP Success message 
12. The AP sends the broadcast key and key length to the client, encrypted with the client's WEP key. 
 
  
Figure 13: EAP-TLS Authentication Process [9] 
 
3.3.2.5. EAP-TTLS / PEAP [9] 
 
It is a hybrid method combining EAP-TLS and a traditional password-based method or another legacy 
method. This is to remove the burden of managing user certificates. Only the server needs a certificate. Like 
with EAP-TLS, encryption keys are generated during the authentication exchange. 
 
For client-side authentication, Protected EAP (PEAP) can use any other EAP authentication type. Because 
PEAP establishes a secure tunnel via server-side authentication, non-mutually authenticating EAP types can 
be used for client-side authentication, such as EAP generic token card (GTC) for one-time passwords 
(OTP), and EAP MD5 for password based authentication. 
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PEAP is based on server-side EAP-TLS, and it addresses the manageability and scalability shortcomings of 
EAP-TLS. Organizations can avoid the issues associated with installing digital certificates on every client 
machine as required by EAP-TLS and select the method of client authentication that best suits them. 
3.3.2.5.1. PEAP Authentication Process 
PEAP authentication begins in the same way as EAP-TLS (Refer Figure 14): 
1. The client sends an EAP Start message to the AP. 
2. The AP replies with an EAP Request Identity message. 
3. The client sends its Network Access Identifier (NAI), which is its username, to the AP in an EAP 
Response message. 
4. The AP forwards the NAI to the RADIUS server encapsulated in a RADIUS Access Request message. 
5. The RADIUS server will respond to the client with its digital certificate. 
6. The client will validate the RADIUS server's digital certificate. 
From this point on, the authentication process diverges from EAP-TLS. 
7. The client and server negotiate and create an encrypted tunnel. 
8. This tunnel provides a secure data path for client authentication. 
9. Using the TLS Record protocol, a new EAP authentication is initiated by the RADIUS server. 
10. The exchange will include the transactions specific to the EAP type used for client authentication. 
11. The RADIUS server sends the AP a RADIUS ACCEPT message, including the client's WEP key, 
indicating successful authentication. 
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Figure 14: PEAP Authentication Process [9] 
 
3.4. 802.1 X over 802.11 
 
In this section, I show how 802.1 X can integrate with 802.11. (Refer Figure 15). 
 
1) The STA must first associate with an AP. In 802.11, the association follows the authentication (Open-
system or Shared-key). Once the association is made, the communication between the STA and the AP can 
start. The authentication server uses specific authentication techniques, to verify client’s identity 
(Passwords, digital certificates). 
 
2.a) The supplicant can trigger the authentication process by sending an EAPOL start message. The 
authenticator allows only EAP traffic and blocks all other traffic, such as HTTP, DHCP, and POP3 packets. 
 
2.b) The authenticator sends an EAP-Request/Identity packet to the supplicant once it has associated with 
the AP. 
 
3) The supplicant sends an EAP-Response/Identity packet to the authenticator to prove its identity. The 
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packet is then routed to the authentication server encapsulated in RADIUS protocol (an EAP-Message 
attribute is used to encapsulate EAP packets for transmission from the authenticator to the RADIUS server). 
 
4) The authentication server sends back a challenge to the authenticator. The challenge depends on the EAP 
method chosen. The authenticator unpacks this from RADIUS and re-packs it into EAPOL and sends it to 
the supplicant. At this point, the number of exchanged messages will vary according to the EAP method. 
Only mutual authentication is considered appropriate for WLANs. 
 
5) The supplicant replies to the challenge via the authenticator, which routes the response to the back-end 
server. 
 
6) If the supplicant provides appropriate credentials, the authentication server responds with a success 
message -Access Accept-, which is then forwarded to the supplicant. The authenticator now unblocks the 
controlled port and allows normal traffic. However, RADIUS allows a per-user configuration. Certain users 
may have restricted access. In this case, the restrictions are specified in the RADIUS message Access-
accept sent to the AP. For example, the authenticator might switch the supplicant to a particular VLAN or 
install a set of firewall rules. EAP supports dynamic keying. That happens when the authentication 
succeeds. 
 
7) EAPOW-key is used to transport the global keys. 
  
8) An EAPOL logoff notification can be sent to the authenticator to announce the end of the connection. 
802.1 X also defines a re-authentication timer, which can be used to periodically require the Supplicant to 
re-authenticate. 
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Figure 15: 802.1 X over 802.11 
 
 
3.5. 802.1 X Vulnerabilities 
 
In the paper [7], the authors Arbaugh and Mishra, expose the fact that the 802.1 X protocol is severely 
flawed for a very simple reason, the authentication protocol is only one sided i.e. there is no mutual 
authentication. 802.1 X lets the AP make sure the user is authentic but it fails to provide a reciprocal 
method by which the user can guarantee the authenticity of the AP. This exposes the system to Man-In-
Middle (MIM) Attacks and session hijacking. Other vulnerabilities in 802.1 X are carried out by Denial-Of-
Service (DoS) attacks. 
 
 
Session Hijacking [10] 
 
Once the STA (Supplicant) authenticates with the AP (Authenticator), the attacker spoofs the MAC address 
of the AP and sends MAC disassociate requests. Once the STA sees the disassociate request it disassociates. 
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The RSN state machine (Refer Figure 16) goes to UNASSOCIATE and 802.1 X is still in 
AUTHENTICATED state. 
 
 
Figure 16: RSN State Machine 
 
The attacker then gains access to the network spoofing the MAC address of the STA, 802.1 X state machine 
for AP is still in authenticated state. (Refer Figure 17). 
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Figure 17: Session Hijack Flow [10] 
 
 
Denial Of Service attacks [10] 
 
DoS attacks can be performed in many ways. One way a DoS attack is performed is by 802.11 Management 
frame spoofing. Since the AP sends de-authenticate messages, the STA gets logged off. 802.11 
management messages include beacon, probe request/response, association request/response, reassociation 
request/response, disassociation, and deauthentication. Without authenticating these management messages, 
denial of service attacks are possible. 
 
Another DoS attack is to send a flood of associate requests [8]. After the 802.11 association phase and 
during 802.1 X authentication phase, the AP can hold only a set limit of state information and if a lot of 
requests are flooded, the AP can not accept these requests. 
 
Lucent, Cisco, Funk Software have come up with separate replies for 802.1 X vulnerabilities. Their 
solutions perform mutual authentication between STA and AP. The dynamic keys are created locally on the 
client and server. 
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Cisco’s LEAP, which is also called Light EAP uses dynamic WEP keys, mutual authentication and the AP 
rejects packets that are not encrypted. 
 
Lucent’s CHAP performs client authentication with AP and there is a TLS tunnel between client and server. 
The client authenticates a digital certificate from the server, then the client sends a hashed password, name 
and challenge. 
 
Kerberos and LEAP are vulnerable to dictionary attacks [15] and there are lots of LEAP cracking tools 
available like ASLEAP , THC LEAP and ANWRAP LEAP. 
 
Most of the problems in 802.1 X seem to be addressed with 802.11 i but there will still be a need for change 
of hardware and firmware. IEEE 802.11 i does not have any defense mechanisms for some of the Denial-of-
Service attacks like PLME_DSSSTESTMODE (Jamming) attack since it protects MAC layer Protocol Data 
Units (PDUs) and PLME_DSSSTESMODE attack operates at the Physical Layer Convergence Protocol 
(PLCP) layer. Hence there is still a need for security on 802.11, 802.1 X or 802.11 i network based systems. 
Any unprotected 802.11, 802.1 X or 802.11 i network is vulnerable to many attacks and WIDS can provide 
an external layer of security to protect these networks. 
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Chapter 4. INTRUSION DETECTION 
 
Intrusion detection is a process that detects rogue users attempting to access, have already accessed, or have 
compromised the WLAN. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for WLANs can be host-based, network-based, 
or hybrid, the hybrid combining features of host- and network-based IDS [27].  
 
A host-based IDS includes a host-based program, which is installed on a system and monitors it for 
suspicious behavior. The agent could halt an attack on a system but its primary function is to log and 
analyze events and send alerts.  
 
A network-based IDS monitors network traffic (each packet) in real time and determines whether traffic 
conforms to predetermined attack signatures (activities that match known attack patterns). For example, a 
DoS attack sends packets that are fragmented in such a way as to crash the target system. The network 
monitor will recognize packets that conform to this pattern and take action such as killing the network 
session, sending an e-mail alert to the administrator, or other action specified.  
 
Host-based IDS has an advantage over network-based IDS when encrypted connections such as SSL Web 
sessions or VPN connections are involved, since the agent resides on the component itself, the host-based 
system is able to examine the data after it has been decrypted. In contrast, a network-based IDS is not able 
to decrypt data therefore, encrypted network traffic is passed through without investigation. 
 
IDS on wired networks cannot be directly applied to WLANs. A Network-based IDS component on a wired 
network behind the AP will not detect attacks directed from one STA to another STA (peer to peer) on the 
same subnet. The wireless AP switches traffic directly between STAs. The traffic does not enter the wired 
network, it is WEP encrypted, and the IDS component does not have an opportunity to capture clear-text 
packets for analysis. IDS components on the wired network usually will not detect attempts to de-associate 
a legitimate STA from the WLAN and will not detect the association of an unauthorized STA with the 
WLAN.  
 
Flooding, jamming, and other DOS attacks against wireless devices use physical and data-link layer 
techniques that are not visible to the IDS components at a packet level. IDS on wired networks will not 
identify the physical location of rogue APs within the building. These rogue APs can act as entry points for 
unauthorized wireless access from remote locations.  
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IDS components will not detect an authorized STA communicating peer-to-peer with an unauthorized STA. 
This scenario can create a bridge into the wired network by allowing a rogue user to connect to a STA that 
is operating in “ad hoc” mode. The ad hoc mode allows a STA to be used to relay traffic to the network and 
creates a number of potential attack scenarios.  
 
There is a need to architect a wireless IDS, that is capable to handle all the shortcomings of a wired IDS. 
Hence a wireless IDS should be capable of detecting unauthorized peer-to-peer communications within the 
WLAN. It should be able to track and physically locate the unauthorized APs/STAs, analyze wireless traffic 
and monitor 802.11 RF space and generate an alarm upon detection of unauthorized configuration changes 
to wireless devices that violate security policy, detect flooding and de-association attempts before they 
successfully compromise the WLAN and provide centralized monitoring and management features. 
 
WIDS is an intrusion detection system that is capable of providing perimeter security to an internal WLAN. 
WIDS is capable of detecting, tracking and locating intruders using directional antenna. WIDS also has the 
capability to sniff passively in RF Monitor mode and analyze wireless traffic and detect outside perimeter 
rogue APs. 
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Chapter 5. TRACKING AND LOCATION 
 
While detection of rogue APs and unauthorized ad-hoc networks is certainly useful, physically tracking the 
offender is more interesting. 
 
Most triangulation today uses directional techniques. A dish or other directional antenna with a narrow 
range is attached to a receiver and then an area is scanned for the strongest signal. The STA is moved some 
distance away, the area is scanned again, and then the position is found using simple trigonometry. (Refer 
Figure 18) 
 
 
Figure 18: Tracking by triangulation. 
 
In practice, there is usually more involved than this. Terrain, obstructions, heat and atmospheric effects, 
reflections, refraction, antenna design, and many other factors that could affect the apparent location of the 
transmitter affect radio propagation. The apparent location of the strongest signal may not actually be the 
location of the transmitter. A full discussion of these effects is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Regardless, the basic theory is sound and can be a very effective technique to locate a transmitter. Another 
technique, not quite as common today, is to locate the transmitter using only the relative signal strength at 
various well-placed locations around the area, and if known, the free-space propagation losses and the 
power of the transmitter. 
 
If we know the output power of the transmitter, the gain of the receiving and transmitting antennas, power 
drop-off, and the received signal strength, location of transmitter to two possible locations should be 
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possible with only two samples. 
 
At point A, from the signal strength and power drop-off equation, we would be able to determine the 
distance from the transmitter (Refer Figure 19). At point B, we would also know that, so the location of the 
transmitter will be found at the point(s) where both dA and dB meet: 
 
 
Figure 19: Tracking by signal strength. 
 
If we do not know the strength of the transmitter or the gain of any of the antennas involved, we just have to 
introduce one more unknown, a signal strength ratio, so the problem turns into a simultaneous equation with 
three unknowns. Thus, a minimum of three data points is needed. If these data points are well placed, there 
should only be one or two realistic solutions to the equations. 
 
A paper by Frank Adelstein, Prasanth Alla, Rob Joyce and Golden G. Richard III [23] related to WIDS 
documents attempts to locate an intruding wireless station. In this paper the authors locate an intruder’s 
position by rotating a directional antenna 360 degree’s while monitoring signal strength. An antenna’s 
signature is computed ahead of time and the intruder’s location is computed by comparing the intruder’s 
data to the signature data. 
 
Experiments were done with three different types of directional antennas. The test antenna was mounted 
on a telescope tripod and connected to a portable AP consisting of a laptop running Linux and HostAP 
[17]. The antenna’s signature was computed by placing an intruder machine a few hundred feet away from 
the AP. The intruder associated with the AP and the directional antenna was rotated in fixed increments and 
the signal strength value was recorded. Readings were taken over a 360 degree range. 
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In order to compute the location of an intruder, several readings of the intruder’s signal strength data were 
made at different angles of the AP antenna. The intruder’s data was correlated with the signature data and 
the computed angle is the angle with the best fit to the known signature data. Two different locations of 
the AP were used. The results of the tests computed the location of the intruder within 2 to 4 degrees. 
The intruder’s location was computed using triangulation with the computed angles and access point 
locations. 
 
The research showed that it is possible to determine the intruder’s location with reasonable accuracy using 
low priced off the shelf hardware and free software. A Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS) could be 
implemented through the knowledge gained from the research to locate intruder’s and also provide an external 
layer of security to a WLAN. 
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Chapter 6. WIDS 
6.1. General Description 
 
Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS) is designed to keep an internal wireless network secure around 
the physical perimeter of the network with special access points to detect and locate intruders. Radio waves 
from a wireless network extend out past the physical perimeter of the network and can be received by 
anyone with the correct equipment. A potential intruder could gain access to the WLAN and possibly a wired 
network behind the WLAN. 
 
Authorized users connect to the internal network APs from within the perimeter. WIDS assumes that 
internal security procedures handle authentication inside the perimeter. Using the assumption that a station 
will associate with the access point from which it receives the strongest signal, a potential intruder outside 
the perimeter would associate with a WIDS access point (WIDS AP) on the perimeter and not with an 
access point in the internal network. The WIDS system would then locate the intruder using the directional 
antennas on two or more WIDS access points. Even if an intruder was able to associate with the internal 
access point from beyond the perimeter, the WIDS AP system directional antennas should still be able to 
locate the intruder, because WIDS can work with signals it picks up and association with a WIDS AP is not 
necessary. 
 
WIDS is designed to give the user control over how it is applied. The user can decide that all stations 
outside the perimeter are intruders or that some stations outside the perimeter are authorized to connect 
to the WIDS APs or the internal network APs. Another possibility is for the WIDS APs to be used as 
honeypots that allow intruders to associate so that an intruder’s activities can be monitored or the intruder 
can be given false or misleading data. The honeypot scenario is not implemented as part of this paper. 
 
WIDS APs use a set of rules to identify potential intruders. The rules can search for known attack 
fingerprints or search according to user defined criteria based on the data in the signal (MAC address, 
IP header information, application data, etc.). Each WIDS AP is equipped with a directional antenna 
which points outward and sweeps in a preconfigured arc searching for wireless users. The WIDS AP 
determines if the remote station is an intruder and it contacts a controlling computer. Other nearby 
WIDS APs are reconfigured by the controller to modify their areas of coverage. Bearings from 
multiple WIDS APs are used by the controller to pinpoint the location of the intruder. The rules can 
trigger actions to interact with the intruder such as denying access, ignoring frames, reacting to IP 
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header data, etc. 
 
6.2. WIDS Architecture and Design 
 
WIDS is an intrusion detection system that is classified as a network based IDS [27]. The WIDS 
architecture consists of one or more WIDS access points connected to a centralized controller via a standard 
wired network. The wired network provides a more secure management of the WIDS AP’s than a wireless 
network. 
 
WIDS APs use an open-source access point code, HostAP [17] and Linux. HostAP allows an 802.11b 
wireless Prism 2/2.5 Ethernet card to be used as an access point instead of a remote station. HostAP has 
been extended to include the additional functions needed by WIDS. The controller is a personal computer 
running Linux. The controller software is written in Perl using Perl-TK to construct the graphical interface. 
 
We investigated several designs and configurations for the WIDS AP hardware and decided that it should be 
an embedded computer equipped with a rotating directional antenna. The WIDS AP would be built from 
components including an X-Scale single board computer and wireless networking platform, a directional 
antenna, a stepper motor to rotate the antenna, and a stepper motor controller. A list of the components is 
presented in the Appendix of this paper. Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain financing to build a fully 
functional WIDS AP equipped with the rotating antenna. A laptop computer without a rotating directional 
antenna was used in our implementation and directional antenna components were simulated in the software, 
for example the antenna readings file was generated by hand. 
 
Since some 802.11 frames that are handled by the Prism 2/2.5’s firmware when in hostAP can only be 
captured by a wireless card in monitor mode, a configuration with two Prism 2/2.5 cards, one in hostAP 
mode and one in monitor mode provides WIDS with more intrusion detection capabilities. The card in the 
monitor mode can capture data, control, and the management frames that are handled by the card’s 
firmware and pass them to the modified HostAP software for processing and testing. The card in the 
monitor mode can also receive the HFA384x (refer section 6.7) transaction frames that show time, signal, 
silence and rate. 
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Figure 20: WIDS Architecture  
 
Figure 20 depicts four WIDS access points, arranged vertically on the left, protecting an internal wireless 
network installed in an arena. Only one side of a WIDS installation is shown in order to keep the picture 
simple. (A complete WIDS installation would include WIDS AP’s on all four sides of the arena.) The WIDS 
access points connect to a controller computer via a wired network. The controller can be located inside the 
perimeter. The arena contains six internal access points. The signals transmitted by the internal AP’s extend 
outside of the perimeter of the arena. The arrows originating from each WIDS access point show the current 
orientation of an attached directional antenna. The other dotted lines extending from two of the WIDS 
access points represent station signals picked up by the directional antennas. The triangulation lines 
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represent bearings on the station and a square indicates the location of a station. The outer dotted circles are 
external APs detected by WIDS. Hence, WIDS is designed to strengthen the security of an internal 
wireless network by surrounding physical perimeter of the network with special access points to detect 
and locate intruder signals from a wireless network extended out past the physical perimeter of the 
network received by anyone with the correct equipment. 
 
6.3. Typical WIDS Installation with 802.1 X  
 
A typical WIDS installation (Refer Figure 21) consists of a normal omni-directional AP located in the 
center of the physical facility and WIDS APs located around the perimeter and directional antennas pointing 
outward. (Note that there could be multiple omni, or directional, APs inside the perimeter, I do not show 
them in the figure to keep the explanation at the basic level.)  The WIDS APs sweep their directional 
antennae in preconfigured arcs, searching for wireless users.  Authorized users connect to the omni AP from 
within the perimeter. I also assume that internal security procedures handle authentication inside the 
perimeter. The problem is that the omni AP’s coverage extends beyond the physical perimeter. WIDS 
addresses this problem because an intruder attempting to break into the WLAN from the outside will 
contact the WIDS APs before coming within range of the omni AP. The WIDS APs will detect intrusions 
based on both known attack signatures (such as network probes from NetStumbler [18] or other non-passive 
“war-driving” programs [19]) and behavior based signatures (such as an internal MAC address suddenly 
appearing in an external location on a machine with different OS characteristics than it had previously).   
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Figure 21:  Typical WIDS installation with 802.1 X. 
 
WIDS detects anomalous behavior by tying the signature data into a behavior-based intrusion detection 
system [9, 10]. When a WIDS AP detects an unauthorized wireless user, the controller is contacted and 
other nearby WIDS APs are reconfigured (by the controller) to modify their areas of coverage (i.e., the arc 
that their directional antennae travel through are modified appropriately).  Information from multiple WIDS 
APs is used by the controller in order to pinpoint the physical location of unauthorized users. 
 
 
6.4. WIDS Access Point/Controller Protocol 
 
 
The WIDS access points and the controller communicate over TCP, using the WIDS Access 
Point/Controller Protocol (WCP). This section presents a summary of the communications between 
access points and the controller. Access Point/Controller Protocol message types are printed in upper 
case letters. 
 
An access point starts up and attempts to connect to the controller using sockets. If the access point is 
unable to connect, it retries every 5 seconds. When a connection is made, the access point sends a HELLO 
message to the controller and waits for a response. The HELLO message contains the name of the access 
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point and its location. The controller replies with a CONFIG message containing the beginning and 
ending sweep positions for the antenna, the report rate for sending data to the controller and the intrusion 
detection rules to be used by the access point. The antenna begins sweeping and listening for signals. The 
report rate specifies how often the access point sends REPORT messages to the controller. The REPORT 
message contains the access point name, the position (angle) of the antenna, the sweep direction, the time, 
the signal strength received at that position, and the MAC address of the station sending the signal. 
 
When a signal is received which has the maximum signal strength in a specified number of readings, the access 
point sends a POSITION message to the controller. The POSITION message contains the access point name, 
the position of the antenna when the maximum signal strength was received, the MAC address of the station 
sending the signal and whether or not the station is associated with the reporting access point. 
 
The controller maintains a hash of POSITIONS received. The keys are the MAC addresses of the stations 
and the values are strings containing the name of the access point that sent the POSITION message, an 
integer indicating whether or not the access point and the station are associated, and another integer 
indicating whether or not the station has been located. 
 
When a POSITION message is received by the controller, the controller checks the hash for the MAC 
address. If it is not found, the controller adds it to the hash, and checks if the station is associated with 
the reporting access point. If it is associated, the controller determines which neighboring access point 
needs to be reconfigured and sends a RECONFIG message with reconfigured antenna sweep information 
to the applicable access point. 
 
If the MAC address is in the hash, the controller checks the hash value to determine if the station has 
already been located or if a POSITION message from the same access point with the same information has 
been previously received. If so, the controller does nothing. If the MAC is in the hash with a different access 
point and has not been located, the controller will use the information from both access points to compute 
the station’s location. The hash is updated to show that this station has been located. 
 
The controller will display a warning message if the same MAC address is associated with more than one 
access point. This may be an indication that MAC address spoofing has occurred. 
 
When an access point receives a RECONFIG message, it changes the starting sweep position or the ending 
sweep position in accordance with the RECONFIG message. The antenna sweeps to the new position 
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twice and then returns to its original sweep configuration. 
 
The controller operator can send messages to an access point to change the intrusion detection rules or to 
collect statistics related to a station associated with the access point. A CHANGERULES message is sent 
to change the intrusion detection rules. When the access point receives a CHANGERULES message, it 
destroys its current rule tree and processes the new rules sent by the controller. A STATS message is sent to 
gather statistics from an access point. The access point returns a STATS message containing a list of 
stations associated with it in response to the controller’s STATS message. The controller operator selects a 
station and sends a MAC message with the station’s MAC address. The access point reads the applicable 
/proc/net/hostap/wlan0/MAC address file (it is a file that contains real time statistics like signal strength, 
transmitted packets, bytes etc sent from the NIC firmware) and sends the stats information back to the 
controller in a MACST message. The controller receives the MACST message, opens a new window and 
displays the stats. 
 
The access point can send a LOGDATA message to the controller. When the controller receives a 
LOGDATA message, it writes the message to the controller’s log file. 
 
 
6.5. WIDS Intrusion Detection Rules 
 
 
Each 802.11b frame received by a HostAP access point which is not handled by the wireless card’s 
firmware can be tested with a set of intrusion detection rules. If the access point also has a wireless card 
operating in the monitor mode, all 802.11b frames received can be tested with the rules. The results of the 
rules tests are intended to identify potential intruders. 
 
A rule has the format type-subtype, a test list consisting of one or more pairs of test and test data, and one 
pair of action and action data. The type-subtype is the 802.11 frame type-subtype, the test is one of the 
tests defined in the WIDS AP software, the test data is data used in the test, the action is one is one of the 
actions defined in the WIDS AP software, and the action data gives more information about the action. The 
action is performed only if all of the tests in the rule are true. 
 
The type-subtype, test list, and action are separated by ‘,’. The test list is enclosed by ‘(‘ and 
‘)’. The test keyword and test data are separated by a ‘:’. The end of a test keyword test data pair is 
designated by an ‘!’. An action consists of an action keyword and action data pair. The action keyword 
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is separated from the action data by a ‘:’. 
 
The test keyword generally describes an operation on a field in the 802.11 or the IP frame, such as 
SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS for source MAC address equals, TTL_LESS_THAN for time to live is less 
than, or FLAG_PWRMGMT for power management is on or off. The value to be tested is given by the 
rule’s test data. Sample test data for test keywords are 00022D2E5C6a for SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS, 64 
for TTL_LESS_THAN and OFF for FLAG_PWRMGMT. 
 
An example of a rule is: 
"MGMT_ASREQ, (SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C6a! FLAG_WEP:OFF!), LOG, 
assoc request from 00:02:2D:2E:5D:6a  flag wep off" 
 
This rule is testing an association request. It is true if the source MAC address is 00:02:2D:2E:5C:6a and the 
wep flag is 0. If the rule is true, the WIDS AP will send a message to the controller, which displays the 
message in a terminal window and logs the message in a file. The message includes the WIDS AP name, date 
and time of message, and the action data “assoc request from 00:02:2D:2E:5D:6a  flag wep off.”.  
 
6.6. Tools 
 
WIDS is based on open-source access point, HostAP [17], using Prism 2/2.5/3 wireless card drivers. The 
capabilities of WIDS include user specifiable, trigger based intrusion detection, allowing the user running 
the WIDS Controller to tailor the criteria that trigger alarms. Triggers are based on both packet/frame data 
and historical/behavioral data including typical signal strength levels, locations, time-to-live (TTL) values, 
IPIDs, etc. for particular MAC addresses. For example, I could specify that packets from MAC 
00:20:E0:8C:92:88 must have a TTL of 30 and a signal strength greater than 10, any packets from this 
MAC address not meeting those criteria will raise an alert. This is similar to a honeypot or honeynet [16], 
but allows more detailed control. HostAP is publicly available software and consists of a set of loadable 
kernel modules and a user-space daemon (HOSTAPD), under Linux, for interacting with and configuring 
the module that make an 802.11b wireless NIC become an AP (instead of a remote STA).  
 
6.6.1. Host AP 
 
Host AP is an open source implementation of Linux drivers for Intersil Prism 2/2.5/3 chipset based 802.11b 
 52
network cards. It supports operation in a variety of modes such as: 
 
• Managed – client connected to an AP 
• Master – serves as an AP 
• Monitor – passive RF monitoring 
 
The most interesting aspect of Host AP drivers is operation in Master mode where a standard 802.11b NIC 
can be used as an AP. Host AP accomplishes this by configuring the card to operate in a mode which is 
specific to Prism chipsets – the Host AP mode. 
 
In Host AP mode, the firmware performs all time critical tasks of APs like the periodic transmission of 
beacon frames and the transmission of probe response frames in response to probe requests. Other AP 
related tasks are left to the host driver to accomplish. It essentially provides hooks in the firmware that call 
host level handlers while passing the packet that was received up to the kernel. It completely implements all 
AP functionality like association/disassociation, authentication/deauthentication, and bridging (wired to 
WLANs). The drivers can also be compiled with the HOSTAPD option, which will transfer all AP handling 
tasks from the driver level to a user level daemon and there is no need to recompile and reinitialize the 
kernel to apply code changes. 
  
Host AP also supports Linux Wireless Tools. It provides a unified configuration interface (iwconfig) for all 
wireless cards on the system. It also implements a set of wireless ioctls that can be used to reconfigure the 
wireless adapter directly in a program.  
 
6.6.2. Kismet 
 
Kismet [24] is an 802.11 layer2 wireless network detector, sniffer, and intrusion detection system. 
Kismet will work with any wireless card which supports raw monitoring (rfmon or RF Monitor) 
mode, and can sniff 802.11b, 802.11a, and 802.11g traffic.  
 
Kismet identifies networks by passively collecting packets and detecting standard named 
networks, detecting (and given time, de-cloaking) hidden networks, and infering the presence of 
non-beaconing networks via data traffic. 
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 6.6.2.1. Kismet.conf 
 
I faced many issues before I got Kismet to work properly using Lucent Technologies Orinoco card. 
Kismet requires the version 14 of Wireless Tools for Linux [30] containing iwconfig, iwpriv and 
ioctl’s. Kismet uses ioctl on the firmware of Orinoco card to function in RF Monitor mode. 
 
One of the important files to get Kismet to work properly is the configuration file (Kismet.conf). 
The settings in the configuration have been set up to specifically be compatible with the Lucent 
Technologies Orinoco Silver 11mb Card and configured to run on the interface eth0. The 
configuration file contains information like source, which in this case is Orinoco, the name of the 
interface, which in this case is eth0. It also contains information on setting up the format type for 
the output .network file that Kismet creates with respect to the networks and stations that it finds. 
The configuration file is as follows : 
 
# Kismet config file 
# Most of the "static" configs have been moved to here -- the command line 
# config was getting way too crowded and cryptic.  We want functionality, 
# not continually reading --help! 
 
# Version of Kismet config 
version=2.8.1 
 
# Name of server (Purely for organizational purposes) 
servername=Kismet 
 
# MAC addresses to filter, comma seperated.  
#macfilter=DE:AD:BE:EF:00:00 
 
# Known WEP keys to decrypt, bssid,hexkey.  This is only for networks where 
# the keys are already known, and it may impact throughput on slower hardware. 
# Multiple wepkey lines may be used for multiple BSSIDs. 
# wepkey=00:DE:AD:C0:DE:00,FEEDFACEDEADBEEF01020304050607080900 
 
# Is transmission of the keys to the client allowed?  This may be a security 
# risk for some.  If you disable this, you will not be able to query keys from 
# a client. 
allowkeytransmit=true 
 
# User to setid to (should be your normal user) 
suiduser=jvigo 
 
# Port to serve GUI data 
tcpport=2501 
# People allowed to connect, comma seperated IP addresses or network/mask 
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# blocks.  Netmasks can be expressed as dotted quad (/255.255.255.0) or as 
# numbers (/24) 
allowedhosts=127.0.0.1 
# Maximum number of concurrent GUI's 
maxclients=5 
 
# Packet sources: 
# source=capture_cardtype,capture_interface,capture_name 
# Card type - Specifies the type of device. It can be one of: 
#     cisco         - Cisco card with Linux Kernel drivers  
#     cisco_cvs     - Cisco card with CVS Linux drivers 
#     cisco_bsd     - Cisco on *BSD 
#     prism2        - Prism2 using wlan-ng drivers with pcap support (all  
#                      current versions support pcap) 
#     prism2_hostap - Prism2 using hostap drivers 
#     prism2_legacy - Prism2 using wlan-ng drivers without pcap support (0.1.9) 
#     prism2_bsd    - Prism2 on *BSD 
#     orinoco       - Orinoco cards using Snax's patched driers 
#     generic       - Generic card with no specific support.  You will have  
#                      to put this into monitor mode yourself! 
#     wsp100        - WSP100 embedded remote sensor.   
#     wtapfile      - Saved file of packets readable by libwiretap 
#     ar5k          - ar5k 802.11a using the vt_ar5k drivers 
# Capture interface - Specifies the network interface Kismet will watch for 
#  packets to come in on.  Typically "ethX" or "wlanX".  For the WSP100 capture 
#  engine, the WSP100 device sends packets via a UDP stream, so the capture 
#  interface should be in the form of host:port where 'host' is the WSP100 and  
#  'port' is the local UDP port that it will send data to. 
# Capture Name      - The name Kismet uses for this capture source.  This is 
the  
#   name used to specify what sources to enable. 
#  
# To enable multiple sources, specify a source line for each and then use the 
# enablesources line to enable them.  For example: 
# source=prism2,wlan0,prism 
# source=cisco,eth0,cisco 
 
#source=cisco,eth0,Kismet 
source=orinoco,eth0,Kismet 
#source=prism2_hostap,wlan0,Kismet 
 
# Comma-separated list of sources to enable.  This is only needed if you wish  
# to selectively enable multiple sources. 
# enablesources=prism,cisco 
 
# Do we have a GPS? 
gps=false 
# Host:port that GPSD is running on.  This can be localhost OR remote! 
gpshost=localhost:2947 
 
# How often (in seconds) do we write all our data files (0 to disable) 
writeinterval=300 
 
# Do we use sound? 
# Not to be confused with GUI sound parameter, this controls wether or not the 
# server itself will play sound.  Primarily for headless or automated systems. 
sound=false 
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# Path to sound player 
soundplay=/usr/bin/play 
# Optional parameters to pass to the player 
# soundopts=--volume=.3 
# New network found 
sound_new=/usr/local/share/kismet/wav/new_network.wav 
# Network traffic sound 
sound_traffic=/usr/local/share/kismet/wav/traffic.wav 
# Network junk traffic found 
sound_junktraffic=/usr/local/share/kismet/wav/junk_traffic.wav 
# GPS lock aquired sound 
# sound_gpslock=/usr/local/share/kismet/wav/foo.wav 
# GPS lock lost sound 
# sound_gpslost=/usr/local/share/kismet/wav/bar.wav 
# Alert sound 
sound_alert=/usr/local/share/kismet/wav/alert.wav 
 
# Does the server have speech? (Again, not to be confused with the GUI's 
speech) 
speech=false 
# Server's path to Festival 
festival=/usr/bin/festival 
# How do we speak?  Valid options: 
# speech    Normal speech 
# nato      NATO spellings (alpha, bravo, charlie) 
# spell     Spell the letters out (aye, bee, sea) 
speech_type=nato 
# speech_encrypted and speech_unencrypted - Speech templates 
# Similar to the logtemplate option, this lets you customize the speech output. 
# speech_encrypted is used for an encrypted network spoken string 
# speech_unencrypted is used for an unencrypted network spoken string 
# 
# %b is replaced by the BSSID (MAC) of the network 
# %s is replaced by the SSID (name) of the network 
# %c is replaced by the CHANNEL of the network 
# %r is replaced by the MAX RATE of the network 
speech_encrypted=New network detected, s.s.i.d. %s, channel %c, network 
encrypted. 
speech_unencrypted=New network detected, s.s.i.d. %s, channel %c, network open. 
 
# Where do we get our manufacturer fingerprints from?  Assumed to be in the 
# default config directory if an absolute path is not given. 
ap_manuf=ap_manuf 
client_manuf=client_manuf 
 
# Use metric measurements in the output? 
metric=false 
 
# Do we write waypoints for gpsdrive to load?  Note:  This is NOT related to 
# recent versions of GPSDrive's native support of Kismet. 
waypoints=false 
# GPSMap waypoint file.  This WILL be truncated. 
waypointdata=%h/.gpsdrive/way_kismet.txt 
 
# How many alerts do we backlog for new clients?  Only change this if you have 
# a -very- low memory system and need those extra bytes, or if you have a high 
# memory system and a huge number of alert conditions. 
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alertbacklog=50 
 
# File types to log, comma seperated 
# dump    - raw packet dump 
# network - plaintext detected networks 
# csv     - plaintext detected networks in CSV format 
# xml     - XML formatted network and cisco log 
# weak    - weak packets (in airsnort format) 
# cisco   - cisco equipment CDP broadcasts 
# gps     - gps coordinates 
#logtypes=dump,network,csv,xml,weak,cisco,gps 
logtypes=dump,network 
 
# Do we log "noise" packets that we can't decipher?  I tend to not, since  
# they don't have anything interesting at all in them. 
noiselog=false 
 
# Do we log beacon packets or do we filter them out of the dumpfile 
beaconlog=false 
 
# Do we log PHY layer packets or do we filter them out of the dumpfile 
phylog=true 
 
# Do we do "fuzzy" crypt detection?  (byte-based detection instead of 802.11 
# frame headers) 
# valid option: Comma seperated list of card types to perform fuzzy detection  
#  on, or 'all' 
fuzzycrypt=prism2_legacy,wtapfile 
 
# What type of dump do we generate?  
# valid option: "wiretap"  
dumptype=wiretap 
# Do we limit the size of dump logs?  Sometimes ethereal can't handle big ones. 
# 0 = No limit 
# Anything else = Max number of packets to log to a single file before closing 
# and opening a new one. 
dumplimit=0 
 
# Default log title 
logdefault=Kismet 
 
# logtemplate - Filename logging template. 
# This is, at first glance, really nasty and ugly, but you'll hardly ever 
# have to touch it so don't complain too much. 
# 
# %n is replaced by the logging instance name 
# %d is replaced by the current date 
# %t is replaced by the starting log time 
# %i is replaced by the increment log in the case of multiple logs 
# %l is replaced by the log type (dump, status, crypt, etc) 
# %h is replaced by the home directory 
# ie, "netlogs/%n-%d-%i.dump" called with a logging name of "Pok" could expand 
# to something like "netlogs/Pok-Dec-20-01-1.dump" for the first instance and  
# "netlogs/Pok-Dec-20-01-2.%l" for the second logfile generated. 
# %h/netlots/%n-%d-%i.dump could expand to 
# /home/foo/netlogs/Pok-Dec-20-01-2.dump 
# 
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# Other possibilities:  Sorting by directory 
# logtemplate=%l/%n-%d-%i 
# Would expand to, for example, 
# dump/Pok-Dec-20-01-1 
# crypt/Pok-Dec-20-01-1 
# and so on.  The "dump", "crypt", etc, dirs must exist before kismet is run 
# in this case. 
#logtemplate=%n-%d-%i.%l 
logtemplate=%h/kismet-logs/%n-%d-%i.%l 
#logtemplate=%h/kismet-logs/%n.%l 
 
# Where state info, etc, is stored.  You shouldnt ever need to change this. 
# This is a directory. 
configdir=%h/.kismet/ 
 
# cloaked SSID file.  You shouldn't ever need to change this. 
ssidmap=ssid_map 
 
# Group map file.  You shouldn't ever need to change this. 
groupmap=group_map 
 
# IP range map file.  You shouldn't ever need to change this. 
ipmap=ip_map 
 
To get  Kismet started we need to run the “kismet_monitor –H” command on the terminal window. 
This starts Kismet Hopper, which hops through different channels to find networks and then run 
“Kismet” command on the terminal window. 
 
To keep acquiring data in the passive RF Monitor mode we need to run a script every 5 seconds 
containing the command iwpriv eth0 force_reset which forces a reset of the wireless card to RF 
Monitor mode.  
 
 
6.6.2.2. Kismet.pl 
 
The output data from Kismet is stored in two formats (.dump) and (.network). The .network  file is 
used by a perl script called Kismet.pl to communicate with WIDS Controller about all 
external/rogue access points that were found by Kismet. Kismet also de-cloaks hidden networks. 
Only external access points that have an SSID show up on the controller. 
  
The .dump file can be opened using Ethereal (next section) and we can gather more information 
about networks by static filtering. 
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The Kismet.pl file is as follows : 
 
#! /usr/bin/perl 
 
#system ("for files in `ps -ef| grep perl | awk '{print $2}'`; do kill -9 
$files ; done"); 
 
$cwd = "/home/jvigo/kismet-logs"; 
chomp $cwd ; 
$debug = 1; 
print "Now running script in $cwd\n" if $debug; 
$date = `date +"%b-%d-%Y"`; 
chomp $date; 
print "Current date is $date \n" if $debug; 
#@logfiles =  glob ("Kismet-May-25-2005-*\.network"); 
#@logfiles =  glob ("$cwd/Kismet-May-25-2005-*\.network"); 
@logfiles =  glob ("$cwd/Kismet-${date}-*\.network"); 
foreach $logfiles (@logfiles){ 
if ($logfiles =~ /Kismet-\w+-\d+-\d+-(\d+)/){ 
 $number = $1; 
} 
push @latest, $number; 
} 
print "Latest array is @latest \n" if $debug; 
@descending = sort { $b <=> $a } @latest; 
#$uselog="$cwd/Kismet-May-25-2005-${descending[0]}.network"; 
$uselog="$cwd/Kismet-${date}-${descending[0]}.network"; 
print "This is the log file used $uselog\n" if $debug; 
open (LOG, "$uselog")|| die "Can't open: $!\n"; 
$x = 1; 
while ( $line = <LOG>){ 
  if ($line =~ /Network\s\d:\s"(.*)"\sBSSID/){ 
    $network=1; 
    if (( $1 eq "jv.cs.uno.edu" ) || ( $1 eq "<no ssid>")){ 
          $network=0; 
   next; 
    } 
  $accesspt= $1; 
  #$accesspt = "OutAP".$x; 
  $x = $x + 1; 
  } 
  if ($line =~ /Type\s+:\s+infrastructure/ && $network == "1"){ 
    push @accesspt, $accesspt; 
  } 
 
} 
 
print "These are the available access points: @accesspt\n" if $debug; 
#$port=2000; 
#$xdata=10; 
#$ydata=400; 
$xx = 0; 
$yy = 0; 
foreach $accesspt (@accesspt){ 
$pid = fork; 
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die "fork:$!" unless defined $pid; 
if($pid){#parent 
} else { 
#system ("perl -w wids.pl -accesspt configfile 192.168.1.4 7777 $accesspt $port 
0 $xdata $ydata data8 1 &"); 
 
$port = random(2000,6000); 
 
if ($xx eq 0){ 
$xdata = random(10,50); 
} else { 
$xdata = random(450,530); 
} 
 
 
if ($yy eq 0){ 
$ydata = random(450,530); 
} else { 
$ydata = random(10,50); 
} 
 
$test = open(TEST,"perl -w wids.pl -accesspt configfile 192.168.1.4 7777 
$accesspt $port 0.08 $xdata $ydata data8 1 |"); 
print "command is perl -w wids.pl -accesspt configfile 192.168.1.4 7777 
$accesspt $port 0.0 $xdata $ydata\n" if $debug; 
close (TEST); 
exit 0; 
} 
 
if ($xx eq 0){ 
$xx = 1; 
} else { 
$xx = 0; 
} 
 
if ($yy eq 0){ 
$yy = 1; 
} else { 
$yy = 0; 
} 
 
#print "command is perl -w wids.pl -accesspt configfile 192.168.1.4 7777 
$accesspt $port 0.0 $xdata $ydata\n" if $debug; 
#$port = $port+100; 
#$xdata = $xdata+5; 
#$ydata = $ydata+10; 
} 
 
sub random($$){ 
   $lower = $_[0]; 
   $upper = $_[1]; 
   $random = int(rand($upper)); 
   #Keep generating until number falls within range 
   while ($random < $lower) 
   { 
      $random = int(rand($upper)); 
   } 
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   # then print 
   return $random; 
} 
 
 
 
 
6.6.3. Ethereal 
 
Ethereal [25] is a network packet analyzer. A network packet analyzer will try to capture network 
packets and try to display that packet data as detailed as possible. Ethereal can capture live packet 
data from a network interface (Refer Figure 22). One of the main reasons for using Ethereal is that 
it allows the Open and Save of packet data that is captured. 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Example of a .dump file from Kismet analyzed using Ethereal 
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6.6.4. FakeAP 
 
Fakeap [25] creates fake 802.11b access points. It can be used as a rule action. Fakeap was modified 
to read MAC addresses and vendors from file that contains authorized OUI values for MAC 
address. Fakeap sends out an unlimited number of fake access points. When the fakeap action is 
triggered, a window pops up on the controller’s screen that has a button that is used to stop sending 
fake access points and to restore the WIDS AP original essid and MAC address. 
 
 
6.6.5. Scoop 
 
Scoop [14] is written by Mike D. Schiffman. Scoop is a program which captures and decodes IP 
frames. Some changes were made to scoop to enable it use the intrusion detection rules. 
 
If an intrusion detection rule needs information from an IP packet such as the time to live (TTL), 
HostAP forks a new process and runs a program scoop.c that listens for IP packets on wlan0. 
The IP listener program is based on libpcap and communicates with HostAP via shared memory. 
When an IP packet meeting the rule criteria is received, the IP listener signals HostAP and HostAP 
takes the action that is described in the intrusion detection rule. 
 
The shared memory is initialized when the access point starts up. Semaphores are used to control 
access to the shared memory. The shared memory and semaphore id’s are stored in the hostapd 
struct. The new process that listens for IP packets needs to know the shared memory and 
semaphore id’s. They are passed to the new process as command line arguments in the execl 
command. The IP listener process for scooping, is started as follows: 
 
sprintf(filter,"%s%s","ip[8] > ", rule->test_data1); 
execl("/home/jvigo/BOSNST/Scoopshared/scoop","scoop", "-i", "wlan0","-a",ascshmid,"- 
m",ascsemid,"-x",filter,(char*)0); 
 
On termination scoop detaches from shared memory segment and removes the shared memory 
segment and semaphore. 
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 6.7. WIDS Implementation 
 
All the code modifications to Host AP were done in the HOSTAPD module. Before I explain the 
implementation part of WIDS, I would like to discuss some of the issues that I faced. One of my main 
findings with Host AP mode was that not all packets were being received by HOSTAPD. Packets like probe 
requests and control frames were being absorbed by the firmware. I also did not receive any packets that 
were not destined for the MAC address of my NIC. Critical tasks like probe request handling and beacon 
broadcasts were handled by the firmware. One of the main reasons why I wanted to get a handle on probe 
Requests and beacon broadcasts was to detect NetStumbler but I shall discuss that later in the NetStumbler 
detection section. 
 
The Monitor mode, also known as the RF Monitor mode, is used by network sniffing tools like Ethereal 
[25], Airsnort [11], and Kismet [24] to analyze all packets on the network. I looked into wlansniff.c file 
which was provided in the Host AP distribution and was able to listen to all packets but AP functionality 
was no longer enabled in this mode. The firmware just left the receiver on and sent all packets through the 
protocol stack without processing. Hence I decided to have two network interfaces, one set up in Host AP 
mode (wlan0) and the other set up in Monitor mode (eth0) and start communication between both networks 
(eth0, wlan0) and WIDS controller. 
 
Firstly, I shall discuss code implementation in the WIDS Module. The rules engine is based of a tree 
structure where the root is the rule and its children are Control Frames (CONT), Data Frames (DATA) and 
Management Frames (MGMT). These three types of frames have a number of sub-types. I also have actions 
that are defined as Alert, Log, Pass, Suspicious, Other and Deny. The rules for each WIDS AP are stored in 
a hash and any rule can be added, changed or deleted from the Controller. Once a WIDS AP detects a 
malicious NIC or AP it sends the signal strength , mac address and position of the intruder to the controller 
and the controller responds to neighboring WIDS AP depending on the position, to change its sweep angle 
and try to locate the intruder. Once the neighboring WIDS AP sends its information about the intruder to the 
controller, it can triangulate and locate the intruder. The WIDS Simulator provides a live view of the 
intrusion detection process. 
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Figure 23: Rules Tree 
 
The tree contains the intrusion detection rules used by WIDS (Refer Figure 23).  There are two branches 
under the root. The 802.11b branch can be used for wireless cards running in either the hostAP mode or 
monitor mode. The HFA384x branch requires a wireless card to be in monitor mode and needs the two card 
implementation of WIDS. Rules were implemented only for the 802.11b branch. Rules for HFA384x can be 
built into Kismet.pl since Kismet does report all information from HFA384x transaction frames. 
 
The code implementation in the Controller Module is to deal with the communication between WIDS AP 
and controller using WCP and triangulating with the help of information received from at least two WIDS 
APs to locate an intruder. 
 
The code implementation of the WIDS Simulator was done in Perl using Perl-TK for constructing graphical 
interface. It is an user interface that shows real time analysis to intrusion detection and also allows users to 
change rules and get statistics. 
 
 
6.7.1. Kismet related files, Kismet.pl 
 
 
The Kismet.pl file scans through the chronologically latest Kismet.network file, for example (Kismet-Jun-
26-2005-1.network) and communicates with the WIDS Controller by sending it a message that a new virtual 
access point exists. The Kismet.pl excludes SSID’s, jv.cs.uno.edu and <no ssid> since jv.cs.uno.edu is a 
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WIDS AP and Kismet finds it and <no ssid> is a cloaked AP and there is a need to wait for Kismet to de-
cloak it. It only reports access points running in infrastructure mode. The WIDS Controller graphical 
interface is a simple X and Y axis grid with a minimum value of 0 and maximum value of 540 for both X 
and Y axis. The X and Y locations of the access points are created through a random function that keeps the 
numbers created with in the max range of the WIDS GUI which is 540 on X and Y directions and outside of 
the inner perimeter. These locations are generated randomly since I did not use directional antenna to 
calculate the locations. The ports on which the access points connect to the WIDS controller are also 
generated randomly. 
 
The Kismet.pl can be run on a scheduled Cron job every five minutes. 
 
6.8. WIDS Controller Module 
 
This module performs all the core central functions with respect to detecting intruders by communicating 
with other WIDS APs to change angle or direction of sweep and also the controller consists of a real time 
analysis user interface that shows all the WIDS APs and also the current sweep routines performed by 
WIDS APs. The controller module is written in Perl and uses Perl-TK for constructing the graphical 
interface. 
 
Two of the controller’s responsibilities are to provide the access points with information needed to 
configure/reconfigure the directional antenna and to provide the intrusion detection rules for the access 
point. The controller reads a configuration file at startup. The configuration file contains a hash of 
HostAP/WIDS AP names and their beginning sweep positions, ending sweep positions, and report rates, a 
hash of internal (non-WIDS) access points and their locations, the size of the grid for specifying access 
point locations and a hash of the HostAP/WIDS AP names and their related locations, a numerical ID, and 
the midpoint of the beginning and ending sweep positions. The access points ID’s are numbers starting 
with 1 for left bottom corner of the perimeter and proceeding in a counterclockwise direction, 2 for the next 
access point, 3 for the next access point, etc. until all access points have a number. Numbering in this matter 
eliminates the need to consider x and y position values when comparing the location of one access point 
compared to the location of another. 
 
After the controller configuration is completed, the controller displays a GUI containing an image of the area 
to be protected and the internal non-WIDS access points. The controller opens a socket on a specified port 
and listens for messages from the access points. Messages are handled by the WIDS Communication 
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Protocol (WCP) (Refer section 6.5). WIDS APs are displayed on the GUI as they are connected to the 
controller. The position of the antenna of each access point is designated by a sweeping line. The controller 
assumes that a station associates with the access point closest to it. 
 
The controller operator can change the rules file, display statistics about the stations connected to the 
WIDS AP or query the log file. Screen shots of those operations are shown below. 
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Figure 24: Change rules file 
 
Figure 24 shows the WIDS Controller user select the WIDS AP, HOSTAP and then select the rule files for 
that WIDS AP.
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Figure 25: Show Stats 
 
Figure 25 shows the WIDS Controller user click the Get Stats button on the graphical interface and 
then select a WIDS AP with a MAC address ’00:02:2D:2E:5C:61’ and then double click it to see all 
the statistics of the WIDS AP. 
 
The controller uses a simple algorithm to determine which access point to reconfigure when a maximum 
signal strength position has been received from an access point. If the position is greater than the access 
point's sweep midpoint, then the access point with the next highest ID number is reconfigured. If the 
position is less than the sweep midpoint, the access point with the next lowest ID number is 
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reconfigured. When maximum signal strength positions for a MAC address are received from two 
WIDS access points, the controller can locate the access point's position using trigonometry (the law of 
sines and Pythagoras' theorem). The graphical interface draws a square (red) at the calculated location 
of the intruder. 
  
6.9. WIDS Simulator Module 
 
The WIDS system can be run with simulated access points and simulated stations for testing or 
presentation purposes (Refer figures 26 and 27). The simulation handles up to sixteen WIDS 
access points. The WIDS access points can be either real (non-simulated) WIDS/HostAP access 
points, simulated access points or a combination of the two. If real WIDS/HostAP access points are 
used in the simulation, real stations can associate with them. The simulation does not handle 
simulated stations associating with a non-simulated WIDS/HostAP access point. 
 
The simulation is written in Perl using Perl-TK for creating the graphical interface. The simulation 
can be run on the same computer as the controller, the same computer as a real WIDS/HostAP 
access point, or a separate computer. It can be run from a command line or from a GUI. Use of the 
GUI requires a configuration file giving geometry for locating windows and a hash of commands for 
starting access points, controller, and virtual station. Other information in the simulation 
configuration file is controller IP and port for listening, access point name, access point port, delay 
per degree value, location, name of file containing simulated antenna readings, and an association 
allowed value. The delay per degree value determines the sweep speed of the simulated antenna. The 
association allowed determines if clients can associate with the access point. 
 
If the simulation is run on the same computer as the controller or a real WIDS/HostAP access 
points, the performance of the WIDS system may decline significantly. 
 
 
Figure 26: WIDS Simulation Control GUI 
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Figure 27: WIDS simulation with sixteen simulated access points 
 
6.9.1. WIDS Simulated Access Point 
 
A WIDS simulated access point associates with a real (non-simulated) controller and receives no 
802.11b frames. A simulated access point has all the functionality of a real WIDS/HostAP access 
point except it doesn't process or test rules, the only 802.11b type/subtypes implemented are 
associate and disassociate, and it doesn't compute the maximum signal strength location using least 
squares regression [28]. It just picks the position of the maximum value signal strength as a position 
with POINTS/2 increasing trend on one side and POINTS/2 decreasing trend on other side [28]. 
 
6.9.2. WIDS Simulated Station 
 
The simulated station configuration file contains a hash of MAC addresses, locations, show up begin 
time in seconds and show up end time in seconds, a list of IP:port pairs representing simulated 
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access points, the time between associates, and the timeframe that a station attempts to associate. 
The timeframe is designated by BEGIN and END in the configuration file. A station appears at 
BEGIN seconds after the virtual station simulation is started and ends END seconds after the virtual 
station simulation is started. The simulation sends ASSOCIATE messages to the list of IP:port pairs 
for simulated stations whose timeframe is in effect. The rate of sending the ASSOCIATE messages is 
determined by the time between associates value in the configuration file. 
 
6.9.3. WIDS Simulation 
 
The WIDS Simulation was written by Dr. Richard Golden III and the Hostap code changes and 
additions were done by John Louis Vigo Jr [28]. I have implemented the extension of WIDS to 
include Kismet [24] compatibility and allow WIDS Access Points to also be able to work in RF 
Monitor mode without affecting any functionality of the basic HostAP mode by having two separate 
NICs, one in HostAP mode and the other in RF Monitor mode. Since the WIDS Access points work 
in RF Monitor mode also, I am able to extend WIDS functionality to 802 1.X and 802.11 i networks.  
 
I have referred to a number of experiments with directional antennae [23] in order to characterize the 
locations of wireless STAs based on signal strength and antenna bearing.  In addition, I have created a 
simulation of the WIDS system, written entirely in portable Perl using Perl-TK for graphical 
interfaces. The WIDS simulator (Refer Figure 28), where four WIDS APs (arranged vertically, on the 
right, blue in the simulator) are protecting an internal WLAN installed in an arena (depicted as a set 
of six APs in the center of the diagram).  Arrows originating from each WIDS AP show the current 
orientation of an attached directional antenna.  The other lines emanating from each WIDS AP are 
estimates of an intruder’s location; intruders are squares (in red in the simulator) on the exterior of the 
arena. The external dots (in purple in the simulator) are external/rogue access points that have 
surfaced in the outside perimeter. These external access points are detected by the wireless card 
running Kismet in RF Monitor mode.  
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Figure 28: The WIDS simulator. 
 
The WIDS simulator communicates over TCP, implementing a subset of our WIDS AP/Controller 
Protocol (WCP) discussed in the next section. WCP is a standard client/server protocol built 
specifically to handle communication between WIDS APs and Controller. Individual components can 
be started and stopped independently, and other components react accordingly.  For example, WIDS 
AP components depend on the controller for configuration information, if the WIDS controller is 
taken down, the AP will wait and then reconnect automatically when the controller comes back 
online. Rules can also be changed on individual WIDS APs from the Controller.  
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Chapter 7. DEFENSE MECHANISMS OF WIDS 
 
I have discussed various attacks on 802.11 and 802.1 X networks in previous chapters. This chapter 
discusses how WIDS detects and handles those attacks. As mentioned earlier I have not implemented 
WIDS as a HoneyPot [16], so all STAs and APs outside the perimeter are considered a threat to the 
internal network. WIDS tracks and locates attackers, even if they are ineffective.  
 
Taking advantage of the two NICs (one running in HostAP mode and other in RF Monitor mode) 
implementation, the WIDS AP transforms into a very powerful intrusion detection tool. The HostAP 
mode permits WIDS AP to perform a plethora of functions for example logging data, deny access, 
apply specific rules and produce alerts. The RF Monitor mode permits WIDS AP to work as a stealthy 
passive sniffer. WIDS AP in conjunction with Kismet [24] helps gather raw real time data and 
analyze using Ethereal [25] and also detect rogue APs outside of the perimeter. 
 
7.1. NetStumbler Detection (Eavesdropping) 
 
One of the most commonly used tool for war driving is NetStumbler. There are two ways of detecting 
NetStumbler. One way uses the wireless NIC in HostAP mode and the other uses the wireless NIC in 
RF Monitor mode. The quickest way to detect NetStumbler is through the RF Monitor mode 
and Kismet has an in built NetStumbler detection rule. 
 
NetStumbler is detected through Host AP mode since it queries the AP by issuing a data frame with 
the protocol, Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI) value of 0x00601d and protocol id of 0x0001. 
This packet also contains a payload string of size 58 bytes that can be put into the NetStumbler 
detection rule to identify the version of NetStumbler: 
 
NetStumbler Version Payload String 
• 3.2.0 --  Flurble gronk bloopit, bnip Frundletrune 
• 3.2.3 -- All your 802.11b are belong to us 
• 3.3.0 -- intentionally blank  
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7.2. Denial of Service Attacks  
 
The most common DoS attack is to send continuous disassociation messages. WIDS can keep a track 
of the continuous flow of disassociation frames from a particular MAC address and a rule can be set 
up to send a disassociate message to the malicious NIC or AP after N number of continuous 
disassociation attempts (Refer Figure 29). 
 
 
 
Figure 29:  Continuous Flow of Deauthentiction/Disassociation Messages 
  
 WIDS cannot provide a detection mechanism for Virtual Carrier Sense Attack and 
PLME_DSSSTESTMODE (Jamming) Attack. Both of the above attacks make the wireless medium 
act busy and thus not available to any STA or AP within range. The WIDS AP and Controller 
communicate with one another through a wired medium and the attack does not cause any 
interference to the wired medium but since the wireless medium is rendered busy the WIDS AP can 
not calculate the location of the intruder. 
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7.3. MAC Spoofing – Identity Theft 
  
I am aware that MAC addresses can very easily be spoofed. Let me give you an example. The MAC 
address of a NIC can be changed using the ‘iwconfig’ utility from wireless utilities. WIDS has a list 
of vendor names that manufacture NIC’s and each manufacturer is allowed to assign a MAC address 
between a certain range of MAC addresses. 
  
WIDS logs every MAC address and cross checks the MAC address with the above list and raises an 
alert if the rule fails. If an attacker spoofs the MAC address of a NIC with another MAC address 
which is in the same range as required for the manufacturer we can still detect by noticing the change 
in sequence on Sequence Numbers in MAC frame. 
 
7.4. Session Hijacking 
 
WIDS is an external layer of protection and WIDS AP’s face the first line of attack with respect to a 
session hijack attempt. The WIDS AP is able to address the issue of spoofed MAC addresses and is 
able to quickly detect such an attempt (Refer to previous section). Since the disassociate request 
comes from an AP with spoofed MAC address the WIDS AP immediately issues a return request to 
the malicious AP to disassociate. Hence it will prevent the session hijack attempt. 
 
WIDS is a very useful active intrusion detection system and I have extended the implementation of 
WIDS AP from a single NIC running in HostAP mode to use two NICs (one running HostAP mode 
and the other running RF Monitor mode). This work and merging of Kismet into the WIDS family 
was a comprehensive part of my thesis. Other intrusion detection systems either work in the Master 
mode or in RF Monitor mode at a given point of time but WIDS always runs in dual mode.  
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Chapter 8. TESTING AND RESULTS
 
WIDS has been tested at various stages of development and I have devised a thorough and complete 
test for WIDS to track and locate unauthorized STAs and external/rogue APs. 
 
8.1 Test - Locating Intruders and External/Rogue Access Points 
 
 
8.1.1 Test Description 
 
There are two neighboring access points connected to the controller. One is a real (non-simulated) 
WIDS AP access point, named HOSTAP, and the other is a simulated access point, named BETA, 
running on the same computer as the WIDS AP access point. 
 
The real station with MAC address 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 associates with the real WIDS AP access 
point. This is a real association and not simulated. The rules are applied to the 802.11 frames received 
from the real station. The WIDS AP access point computes the position of the station 
00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 maximum signal strength using the data in its simulated antenna readings file and 
sends it to the controller. The WIDS controller reconfigures the simulated access point sweep arch. 
 
The simulated access point computes the position of the station 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 maximum 
signal strength using the data in its simulated antenna readings file and sends it to the controller. 
 
The controller computes the position of the station 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 from the data received 
from the two access points. 
 
In order to test the IP packet reading rule, the station 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 pings the WIDS/HostAP 
access point. Four pings were sent from the station. 
 
The controller should also show two networks outside the perimeter. These are external/rogue access 
points detected by Kismet running in passive monitor mode on the HostAP machine. 
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8.1.2 Hardware Used for the Test 
 
One IBM ThinkPad Pentium III 450 MHz, 128 Mb memory laptop with a Linksys Instant 
Wireless WPC11 wireless card (MAC address 00:04:5a:0c:d8:0c) running Linux and HostAP used 
for a WIDS/HostAP access point and a Lucent Technologies Orinoco Silver 11 Mbits/s wireless 
card (MAC address 00:02:2d:2e:5b:f6) running Kismet in Monitor mode. 
 
One generic Pentium 4 266 GHz, 512 Mb memory laptop with an Lucent Technologies Orinoco 
Silver 11 Mbits/s wireless card (MAC address 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61) address running WindowsXP 
used for a station connecting to the WIDS/HostAP access point. 
 
One IBM ThinkPad Pentium III 450 MHz, 128 Mb memory laptop running Linux used for the 
controller. 
 
One Laplink Cable (Parallel Port connection cable) connecting the WIDS/HostAP access 
point and the controller (A Laplink cable was used instead of an Ethernet hub to connect the 
WIDS/HostAP access point and the controller since I wanted to free the second PCMCIA slot 
used by the PCMCIA Ethernet card and use it for a Wireless Card to run Kismet in RF Monitor 
mode). 
 
8.1.3 Expected Results for the Test 
 
 
The rule 
“MGMT_ASREQ,(FLAG_RETRY:OFF!SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!), 
LOG,FLAG RETRY Off” should be true. The controller log should show an entry for HOSTAP 
with a message including the date and time and “FLAG RETRY Off, Association Req.”. Logging the 
association request attempt is very useful to keep track of STAs trying to associate with an AP. 
 
The rule “MGMT_AUTH,(SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!TTL_EQUALS:64! 
FLAG_RETRY:OFF!),LOG, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64” should be true. The 
controller log should show an entry for HOSTAP with a message including the date and time and “02 
2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64, Authentication.” Since four pings are sent with TTL= 64, 
the log should show four messages. 
 
All other rules are false and no action should be taken. 
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The controller log should show association messages with dates and times for station 
00:02:2d:2e:5c:61 with an Agere Systems wireless card. 
 
The WIDS/HostAP log should show messages sent to the controller as a result of the rules. HostAP 
logs all authentications and associations in the /var/log/messages log. There should be messages with 
times and dates for authentication and association for station 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61. 
 
Simulated antenna position of simulated access point BETA antenna when maximum signal received 
from station 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 is 63 degrees. Simulated antenna position of HostAP access point 
HOSTAP antenna when maximum signal received from station 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 is -25 degrees. 
The station is located at (452.94, 334.64). 
 
Pings will be sent from 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 with TTL = 64. HostAP and controller logs should   show 
test results for IP headers from 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61. 
 
Kismet should find three rogue networks ‘Mine’, ‘My Home’ and ‘LASSI’ outside of the perimeter. 
 
 
8.1.4 Results of the Test 
 
The controller log shows only the two lines expected as results of the intrusion detection rules 
(times are gm time): 
 
 
HOSTAP Sun June 26 02:48:13 2005 FLAG RETRY Off Association Req 
HOSTAP Sun June 26 02:51:56 2005  02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64 
Authentication 
 
 
The controller log shows the expected association messages from the two stations: 
 
HOSTAP Sun June 26 02:48:16 2005 associated with  00:02:2d:2e:5c:61 
wireless card Agere Systems 
 
The WIDS/HostAP log shows messages: 
 
 
Sat June 25 21:48:13 2005 
,FLAG RETRY Off,Association Req 
 
Sat June 25 21:51:57 2005 
, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64,Authentication 
 
 
The HostAP access point /var/log/messages log shows authentication and association of station 
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00:02:2d:2e:5c:61. 
 
 
June 25 21:48:13 localhost hostapd: wlan0: STA 00:02:2d:2e:5c:61 IEEE 
802.11: 
authenticated 
June 25 21:48:13 localhost hostapd: wlan0: STA 00:02:2d:2e:5c:61 IEEE 
802.11: 
associated (aid 1) 
 
The controller received the antenna position of 63 degrees for simulated access point BETA antenna 
when the maximum signal message was received from station 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 and the antenna 
position of -25 degrees for HostAP access point HOSTAP antenna when maximum signal received 
message was received from station 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61: 
 
 
WIDS controller received client located at -25 (angle) from 
HOSTAP WIDS controller received client located at 63 (angle) 
from BETA 
 
The controller is an (X, Y) grid and shows the computed station’s location rounded to two decimals 
as (452.94, 334.64): 
 
ALERT client found at x = 452.936474021111 y = 334.641469930032 
 
HostAP and Controller logs show test results for IP headers from 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61. As 
additional testing on the IP packets, Scoop was run with the print hex option to dump the Ethernet 
and IP headers. The hostAP terminal window displayed the following for pings from 
00:02:2D:2E:5C:61. Only the ping from 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 shows a test result as expected. 
 
 
IP: 192.168.0.69 -> 192.168.0.70 (60) id: 15773 ICMP: echo reply 
00 0002 2d2e 5c61 0004 5a0c d80c 0800 4500 
10 003c 3d9d 0000 4001 bb48 c0a8 0045 c0a8 
20 0046 0000 535c 0100 0100 6162 6364 6566 
30 6768 696a 6b6c 6d6e 6f70 7172 7374 7576 
40 7761 6263 6465 6667 6869 
scoop testing packet 
test result is .... 
Wed June 25 21:51:56 2005 
, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64,Authentication 
 log action  02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64 
IP: 192.168.0.69 -> 192.168.0.70 (60) id: 15774 ICMP: echo reply 
00 0002 2d2e 5c61 0004 5a0c d80c 0800 4500 
10 003c 3d9e 0000 4001 bb47 c0a8 0045 c0a8 … 
 
Kismet finds three rogue networks. Kismet does also find the networks, jv.cs.uno.edu  and <no ssid> 
but does not report it to the controller since jv.cs.uno.edu is a WIDS AP and <no ssid> is a hidden 
network with the SSID ‘LASSI’ which after a certain time is de-cloaked by Kismet (Refer Figure 30).  
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Figure 30: Networks found by Kismet. 
 
The following are other screen shots of Kismet : 
 
 
 
Figure 31: Kismet found networks with statistics. 
Kismet provides statistics with respect to the networks that were found. It shows how many APs that 
were have WEP enabled, channel usage of each AP and total number of packets collected (Refer 
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Figure 31). 
 
 
 
Figure 32: Kismet found networks with Packet Types. 
Kismet also provides a screen to see different packet types associated with name of the AP and MAC 
address (Refer Figure 32). 
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Figure 33: Kismet found Networks with one de-cloaked network ‘LASSI’. 
Finally Kismet has found three rogue APs and all the three rogue APs have WEP enabled (Refer 
Figure 33). 
 
8.1.5 Data Files used for Test 
 
 
8.1.5.1 Rules File for the Test  
 
The rules file contains a set of rules that need to be tested for a WIDS AP. The rules files I have used 
for the test is as follows: 
 
MGMT_ASREQ,(FLAG_RETRY:OFF!SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!),LOG,FLAG RETRY 
Off MGMT_ASREQ,(FLAG_RETRY:ON!SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!),LOG,FLAG 
RETRY On MGMT_ASREQ,(DEST_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!),LOG,assoc request dest 
mac 00 02 2d 
2e 5c 61 
MGMT_AUTH,(SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!TTL_EQUALS:64!FLAG_RETRY:OFF!),LOG
, 
02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64 
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8.1.5.2 Access Point MAC Address 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 Antenna Readings File 
 
WIDS does not have rotational directional antenna capability, hence I used an antenna readings file 
for WIDS AP HOSTAP to perform the test. The antenna readings file is as follows: 
 
 
filename "angle4" 
 
 
# format for a reading is degrees,signal strength;mac address, 
# first number represents the angle in degrees. The second number represents 
# the signal strength. 
# next 6 numbers represent mac address. Each reading must be separated by 
',' 
# or '/n' and there must be a '\n' before the EOF character 
# comments start with '#' and the '#' is allowed only at start of line 
-35,10;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-34,12;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-33,16;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,- 
32,20;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-31,23;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-30,25;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,- 
29,27;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-28,24;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-27,27;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,- 
26,28;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-25,29;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-24,26;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,- 
23,27;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-22,25;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-21,23;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,- 
20,20;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-19,16;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,-18,14;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61,- 
17,12;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
 
 
8.1.5.3 Simulated Access Point (BETA) Antenna Readings File 
 
WIDS does not have rotational directional antenna capability, hence I used an antenna readings file 
for WIDS AP BETA to perform the test. The antenna readings file is as follows: 
 
filename "data8" 
 
 
57,32;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
58,33;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
59,38;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
60,40;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
61,44;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
62,45;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
63,47;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
64,44;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
65,43;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
66,41;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
67,30;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
68,29;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
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8.1.5.4 Kismet Output Network File 
 
The output file from Kismet will be used by Kimset.pl to report to the Controller information about all 
the external/rogue access points found by Kismet. The sample file is as follows : 
 
Network 1: "mine" BSSID: "00:0F:66:39:47:52" 
    Type     : infrastructure 
    Carrier  : 802.11b 
    Info     : "None" 
    Channel  : 11 
    WEP      : "Yes" 
    Maxrate  : 54.0 
    LLC      : 2213 
    Data     : 94 
    Crypt    : 94 
    Weak     : 0 
    Total    : 2307 
    First    : "Sun Jun 26 10:54:48 2005" 
    Last     : "Sun Jun 26 14:16:50 2005" 
 
Network 2: "LASSI" BSSID: "00:09:5B:DA:71:48" 
    Type     : infrastructure 
    Carrier  : 802.11b 
    Info     : "None" 
    Channel  : 11 
    WEP      : "Yes" 
    Maxrate  : 11.0 
    LLC      : 5448 
    Data     : 0 
    Crypt    : 0 
    Weak     : 0 
    Total    : 5448 
    First    : "Sun Jun 26 10:54:48 2005" 
    Last     : "Sun Jun 26 14:16:51 2005" 
 
Network 3: "jv.cs.uno.edu" BSSID: "00:04:5A:0C:D8:0C" 
    Type     : infrastructure 
    Carrier  : 802.11b 
    Info     : "None" 
    Channel  : 03 
    WEP      : "No" 
    Maxrate  : 11.0 
    LLC      : 50 
    Data     : 0 
    Crypt    : 0 
    Weak     : 0 
    Total    : 50 
    First    : "Sun Jun 26 10:55:20 2005" 
    Last     : "Sun Jun 26 14:15:15 2005" 
 
Network 4: "My Home" BSSID: "00:09:5B:EB:3A:94" 
    Type     : infrastructure 
    Carrier  : 802.11b 
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    Info     : "None" 
    Channel  : 11 
    WEP      : "Yes" 
    Maxrate  : 36.0 
    LLC      : 21 
    Data     : 0 
    Crypt    : 0 
    Weak     : 0 
    Total    : 21 
    First    : "Sun Jun 26 11:02:45 2005" 
    Last     : "Sun Jun 26 11:22:09 2005" 
 
 
 
8.1.6 Details of Test Results 
 
 
8.1.6.1 HostAP log 
 
log opened log.new Sat June 25 21:47:24 2005 
 
Sat June 25 21:48:13 2005 
,FLAG RETRY Off,Association Req 
 HOSTAPHOSTAPSat June 25 21:51:56 2005 
, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64,Authentication 
 Sat June 25 21:51:57 2005 
, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64,Authentication 
 Sat June 25 21:51:58 2005 
, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64,Authentication 
 Sat June 25 21:51:59 2005 
, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64,Authentication 
 
8.1.6.2 Controller log 
 
hostap.log opened gmtime Sun June 26 03:21:49 2005 
HOSTAP Sun June 26 02:48:13 2005 FLAG RETRY Off Association Req 
HOSTAP Sun June 26 02:48:16 2005 associated with  00:02:2d:2e:5c:61 
wireless card Agere Systems 
 
HOSTAP Sun June 26 02:51:56 2005  02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64 
Authentication 
HOSTAP Sun June 26 02:51:57 2005  02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64 
Authentication 
HOSTAP Sun June 26 02:51:58 2005  02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64 
Authentication 
HOSTAP Sun June 26 02:51:59 2005  02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64 
Authentication 
 
8.1.6.3 Controller Terminal Display 
 
Script started on Sat June 25 22:14:54 2005 
dashipushi:/home/shobanp/widsfinal1 # ./controllernet 
WIDS controller initializing using file "CONFIG.controllerhap". 
KNOWN ACCESS POINT LIST: 
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CTR 
CBR 
PINK
Y 
CTL 
CBL 
LAP1 
BAP1 
BAP3 
ALPH
A 
BAP2 
BETA 
HOSTA
P 
TAP2 
LAP3 
LAP2 
TAP1 
WIDS controller configuration 
complete. WIDS controller bringing up 
GUI. 
WIDS controller: Image is 600 x 416. 
WIDS controller listening on port 
7777. WIDS controller got connection. 
WIDS controller sending CONFIG to BETA. 
WIDS controller configured BETA, located @ (420,270). 
WIDS controller got connection. 
WIDS controller sending CONFIG to HOSTAP. 
WIDS controller configured HOSTAP, located @ (420,350). 
WIDS controller logging HOSTAP Sun June 26 02:48:13 2005 FLAG RETRY Off 
Association Req 
WIDS controller logging HOSTAP Sun June 26 02:48:16 2005 associated with 
00:02:2d:2e:5c:61 wireless card Agere Systems 
 
WIDS controller received client located at -25 (angle) from HOSTAP 
adding to hash 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 HOSTAP;-25;1 
SENDING RECONFIG  to BETA POS = -25 -45 90 2 
WIDS controller received client located at 63 (angle) from BETA 
locating ap 
name1= BETA,position1= 63, name2 =HOSTAP, position2= -25, ap1x=420 ap1y=270 
ALERT client found at x = 452.936474021111 y = 334.641469930032 
WIDS controller received client located at -25 (angle) from HOSTAP 
WIDS controller logging HOSTAP Sun June 26 02:51:56 2005  02 2d 2e 5c 61 
authenticated with ttl = 64 Authentication 
WIDS controller logging HOSTAP Sun June 26 02:51:57 2005  02 2d 2e 5c 61 
authenticated with ttl = 64 Authentication 
WIDS controller logging HOSTAP Sun June 26 02:51:58 2005  02 2d 2e 5c 61 
authenticated with ttl = 64 Authentication 
WIDS controller logging HOSTAP Sun June 26 02:51:59 2005  02 2d 2e 5c 61 
authenticated with ttl = 64 Authentication 
WIDS controller received client located at -25 (angle) from HOSTAP 
Use of uninitialized value in concatenation (.) or string at wids.pl line 
466, 
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<RULES> line 6. 
mesg not defined type = 
** OTHER SIDE HUNG UP 11111 ** 
WIDS controller received client located at -25 (angle) from HOSTAP 
Use of uninitialized value in concatenation (.) or string at wids.pl line 
466, 
<RULES> line 6. 
mesg not defined type = 
** OTHER SIDE HUNG UP 11111 ** 
 
Script done on Sat June 25 22:41:27 2005 
 
The “use of unitialized value …” and “mesg not defined type = “  comments are results 
of the access points shutting down 
 
 
8.1.6.4 HostAP terminal 
 
Script started on Sat June 25 21:25:54 
2005]0;root@localhost:/home/jvigo/hostap-0.0.3/hostapd2new_shared4_clean1 
 
[root@localhost hostapd2new_shared4_clean1]# ./hostapd 
hostapddashipushi.conf 
Configuration file: 
hostapddashipushi.conf table_alloc 
done 
table_alloc rule done 
could not insert in table: key exists and no overwrite,key=00:01:C8, c= 
915 could not insert in table: key exists and no overwrite,key=08:00:30, 
c= 14393 could not insert in table: key exists and no 
overwrite,key=08:00:30, c= 14395 
 
log opened log.new Sat June 25 21:47:24 2005 
 
HOSTAP;17;log opened ;Sun June 26 02:47:24 2005 
ip add= 192.168.1.4, port 7777 
WIDS AP HOSTAP connecting to CONTROLLER @ 
192.168.1.4:7777. controller registered sockfd= 4 
hostap AP HOSTAP sending initial HELLO to WIDS 
controller. WIDS hostap HOSTAP waiting for CONFIG 
message. 
message = CONTROLLER;2;- 
45;45;2;MGMT_ASREQ,(FLAG_RETRY:OFF!SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!),LOG,F
LAG RETRY Off 
MGMT_ASREQ,(FLAG_RETRY:ON!SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!),LOG,FLAG RETRY 
On 
MGMT_ASREQ,(DEST_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!),LOG,assoc request dest mac 00 02 
2d 
2e 5c 61 
MGMT_AUTH,(SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!TTL_EQUALS:64!FLAG_RETRY:OFF!),LOG
, 
02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64 
#MGMT_AUTH,(SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:000D884BE0D6!TTL_EQUALS:64!FLAG_RETRY:OFF!),LO
G, 
00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6 authenticated with ttl = 64 
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#MGMT_AUTH,(SOURCE_MAC_EQUALS:00022D2E5C61!TTL_EQUALS:64!FLAG_RETRY:OFF!),D
ISA SSOC, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 disassociated with ttl = 64 
 
hostap AP HOSTAP received CONFIG: sweep -45 - 45, report rate 2 
processing rules 
Using interface wlan0ap with hwaddr 00:04:5a:0c:d8:0c and ssid 
'jv.cs.uno.edu' Flushing old station entries 
Deauthenticate all stations 
ieee802_11.c 10 /nieee802_11.c auth failed 
wlan0: STA 00:02:2d:2e:5c:61 IEEE 802.11: 
authenticated do auth stuff here 
Sat June 25 21:48:13 2005 
,FLAG RETRY Off,Association Req 
 log action FLAG RETRY Off 
wlan0: STA 00:02:2d:2e:5c:61 IEEE 802.11: associated (aid 1) 
do associate stuff 
here get ant 
readings 
simulated antenna readings ok 
Modified Scoop 1.0 [IP packet sniffing tool] 
<ctrl-c> to 
quit scoop 
pid = 1304 
HOSTAP AP HOSTAP got ASSOCIATE from 00:02:2d:2e:5c:61, signal=120 @ 
position unknown 
HOSTAPieee802_11.c 10 /nieee802_11.c auth failed 
wlan0: STA 00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6 IEEE 802.11: 
authenticated do auth stuff here 
ieee802_11.c 10 /nieee802_11.c auth failed 
wlan0: STA 00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6 IEEE 802.11: 
authenticated do auth stuff here 
wlan0: STA 00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6 IEEE 802.11: associated (aid 2) 
do associate stuff 
here get ant 
readings 
simulated antenna readings ok 
HOSTAP AP HOSTAP got ASSOCIATE from 00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6, signal=0 @ 
position unknown 
HOSTAPmax signal is at -25.6176 sig= 29 
max signal is at -25.6176 sig= 29 
IP: 192.168.0.69 -> 192.168.0.70 (60) id: 15773 ICMP: echo reply 
00 0002 2d2e 5c61 0004 5a0c d80c 0800 4500 
10 003c 3d9d 0000 4001 bb48 c0a8 0045 c0a8 
20 0046 0000 535c 0100 0100 6162 6364 6566 
30 6768 696a 6b6c 6d6e 6f70 7172 7374 7576 
40 7761 6263 6465 6667 6869 
scoop testing 
packet test result 
is .... 
Sat June 25 21:51:56 2005 
, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64,Authentication 
 log action  02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64 
IP: 192.168.0.69 -> 192.168.0.70 (60) id: 15774 ICMP: echo reply 
00 0002 2d2e 5c61 0004 5a0c d80c 0800 4500 
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10 003c 3d9e 0000 4001 bb47 c0a8 0045 c0a8 
20 0046 0000 525c 0100 0200 6162 6364 6566 
30 6768 696a 6b6c 6d6e 6f70 7172 7374 7576 
40 7761 6263 6465 6667 6869 
scoop testing 
packet test result 
is .... 
Sat June 25 21:51:57 2005 
, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64,Authentication 
 log action  02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64 
IP: 192.168.0.69 -> 192.168.0.70 (60) id: 15775 ICMP: echo reply 
00 0002 2d2e 5c61 0004 5a0c d80c 0800 4500 
10 003c 3d9f 0000 4001 bb46 c0a8 0045 c0a8 
20 0046 0000 515c 0100 0300 6162 6364 6566 
30 6768 696a 6b6c 6d6e 6f70 7172 7374 7576 
40 7761 6263 6465 6667 6869 
scoop testing 
packet test result 
is .... 
Sat June 25 21:51:58 2005 
, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64,Authentication 
 log action  02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64 
IP: 192.168.0.69 -> 192.168.0.70 (60) id: 15776 ICMP: echo reply 
00 0002 2d2e 5c61 0004 5a0c d80c 0800 4500 
10 003c 3da0 0000 4001 bb45 c0a8 0045 c0a8 
20 0046 0000 505c 0100 0400 6162 6364 6566 
30 6768 696a 6b6c 6d6e 6f70 7172 7374 7576 
40 7761 6263 6465 6667 6869 
scoop testing 
packet test result 
is .... 
Sat June 25 21:51:59 2005 
, 02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64,Authentication 
 log action  02 2d 2e 5c 61 authenticated with ttl = 64 
IP: 192.168.0.69 -> 192.168.0.71 (60) id: 3257 ICMP: echo reply 
00 000d 884b e0d6 0004 5a0c d80c 0800 4500 
10 003c 0cb9 0000 4001 ec2b c0a8 0045 c0a8 
20 0047 0000 535c 0100 0100 6162 6364 6566 
30 6768 696a 6b6c 6d6e 6f70 7172 7374 7576 
40 7761 6263 6465 6667 6869 
scoop testing packet 
IP: 192.168.0.69 -> 192.168.0.71 (60) id: 3258 ICMP: echo reply 
00 000d 884b e0d6 0004 5a0c d80c 0800 4500 
10 003c 0cba 0000 4001 ec2a c0a8 0045 c0a8 
20 0047 0000 525c 0100 0200 6162 6364 6566 
30 6768 696a 6b6c 6d6e 6f70 7172 7374 7576 
40 7761 6263 6465 6667 6869scoop testing packet 
IP: 192.168.0.69 -> 192.168.0.71 (60) id: 3259 ICMP: echo reply 
00 000d 884b e0d6 0004 5a0c d80c 0800 4500 
10 003c 0cbb 0000 4001 ec29 c0a8 0045 c0a8 
20 0047 0000 515c 0100 0300 6162 6364 6566 
30 6768 696a 6b6c 6d6e 6f70 7172 7374 7576 
40 7761 6263 6465 6667 6869 
scoop testing packet 
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IP: 192.168.0.69 -> 192.168.0.71 (60) id: 3260 ICMP: echo reply 
00 000d 884b e0d6 0004 5a0c d80c 0800 4500 
10 003c 0cbc 0000 4001 ec28 c0a8 0045 c0a8 
20 0047 0000 505c 0100 0400 6162 6364 6566 
30 6768 696a 6b6c 6d6e 6f70 7172 7374 7576 
40 7761 6263 6465 6667 6869 
scoop testing packet 
max signal is at -25.6176 sig= 
29 max signal is at -25.6176 
sig= 29 handle term 
killing 1304 
cleaning up shared memory 
struct eloop.c after loop 
Removing station 00:0d:88:4b:e0:d6 
Removing station 00:02:2d:2e:5c:61 
Flushing old station entries 
Deauthenticate all stations 
]0;root@localhost:/home/jvigo/hostap-0.0.3/hostapd2new_shared4_clean1 
 
[root@localhost hostapd2new_shared4_clean1]# 
[root@localhost hostapd2new_shared4_clean1]# Script done on Wed June 25 
21:54:12 2005 
 
8.1.6.5 BETA AP terminal 
 
[root@localhost root]# cd /root/wids 
[root@localhost wids]# perl accesspt2net 
WIDS AP BETA connecting to controller @ 192.168.1.4:7777. 
WIDS AP BETA sending initial HELLO to WIDS controller. 
WIDS AP BETA waiting for CONFIG message. 
57,32;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
adding to allowed mac hash 00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 associate allowed = 1 
58,33;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
59,38;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
60,40;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
61,44;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
62,45;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
63,47;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
64,44;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
65,43;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
66,41;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
67,30;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
68,29;00:02:2D:2E:5C:61 
WIDS AP BETA received CONFIG: sweep -45 - 45, report rate 2.WIDS AP BETA 
listening on port 7001 for virtual client. reconfig message -45 90 2 
ap got 
reconfig 
vcexists 0 
 reconf received 
position -11, begin -45, end 90 at receive reconf in 
nfound sending position  63,  00:02:2D:2E:5C:61, 0 
pos =-45 end = 90 beg = -45 
back to original config BETA count = 2 end =45 begin = -45 pos =-45, dir= 1 
mac 
 90
0 
[root@localhost wids]# 
 
 
8.1.6.6 Kismet terminal 
 
 
root@localhost root]# kismet_monitor -H 
Will launch kismet_hopper 
Using /usr/local/etc/kismet.conf sources... 
Enabling monitor mode for an orinoco card on eth0 channel 6 
Launching kismet_hopper in the background. 
/usr/local/bin/kismet_monitor: line 238: test: : integer expression 
expected 
[root@localhost root]# Hopping 3 channels per second (333333 microseconds  
per channel) 
NOTICE:  No enable sources specified, all sources will be enabled. 
kismet_hopper - Source 0 - Channel hopping (United States) on interface 
eth0 
 
[root@localhost root]# kismet 
Server options:  none 
Client options:  none 
Starting server... 
Will drop privs to jvigo (500) 
No enable sources specified, all sources will be enabled. 
Source 0 (Kismet): Using pcap to capture packets from eth0 
Dropped privs to jvigo (500) 
Allowing clients to fetch WEP keys. 
Logging networks to /home/jvigo/kismet-logs/Kismet-Jun-26-2005-2.network 
Logging data to /home/jvigo/kismet-logs/Kismet-Jun-26-2005-2.dump 
Writing data files to disk every 300 seconds. 
Filtering beacon packets. 
Reading AP manufacturer data and defaults from /usr/local/etc/ap_manuf 
Reading client manufacturer data and defaults from  
/usr/local/etc/client_manuf 
Dump file format: wiretap (local code) dump 
Kismet 2.8.1 (Kismet) 
Source 0 (Kismet): Capturing packets from libpcap device eth0 
Logging data networks 
Listening on port 2501. 
Allowing connections from 127.0.0.1/255.255.255.255 
Registering builtin client/server protocols... 
Starting UI... 
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8.1.7 Commands to Run Test 
 
 
On HostAP access point laptop: 
 
 
1. Start simulated access point 
 
 
/root/wids # perl accesspt2net 
 
 
2. In another terminal window - start hostapd 
 
/home/jvigo/hostap-0.0.3/hostapd2new_sharedclean1 # ./hostapd 
hostapddashipushi.conf 
 
3. Start Kismet Hopper 
 
 /root# kismet_monitor –H 
 
4. Start Kismet 
 
/root# kismet 
 
5. Run iwpriv every 5 secs to get data through monitor mode on eth0 
 
/root# csh 
/root~ while 1 
> while 5 
> iwpriv eth0 force_reset 
> end 
 
6. Run Kismet.pl 
 
/root/wids # perl Kismet.pl 
 
 
On controller pc: 
 
 
1. Start controller 
 
 
/home/shobanp/widsfinal1# ./controllernet 
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8.2 Test Results and Final Comments 
 
The test was designed to track and locate an intruder and also detect rogue access points on the outer 
perimeter. I used two WIDS APs, a real WIDS AP (HOSTAP) and a simulated WIDS AP (BETA) 
and a controller which handles both real and simulated WIDS access points. Antenna information was 
simulated by using two antenna readings files for HOSTAP and BETA APs. WIDS was able to track 
and locate the intruder and also locate three rogue APs.(Refer Figure 34). 
 
The test produced the expected results and shows that the WIDS software successfully implements 
parts of the complete WIDS package. Kismet also detected rogue external/rogue networks. However, 
the software needs to be extended to handle the rotating directional antennas and tests of the location 
calculations and antenna reconfiguration need to be performed with the actual hardware. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34: Reconfigured BETA AP and HOSTAP locating station.  
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Chapter 9. CONCLUSIONS 
 
9.1. Conclusions 
WIDS system will work very successfully in environments where WLANs requires perimeter 
intrusion detection. WIDS is well suited for military environment, navy shipyards and navy ships. 
The WIDS system contains three modules, which are WIDS Module, Controller Module and WIDS 
Simulator.  
The WIDS Module scans actively for malicious NICs or APs with the help of directional 
antennas. The WIDS Module has a rules engine and specific rules are stored in a hash so real-time 
data can be compared and alerts can be sent as required to the Controller. The Controller Module is a 
vital part in the WIDS system. It manages all the WIDS APs and coordinates WIDS APs to 
triangulate intruders. The WIDS Simulator is an user interface which allows users to add, edit or 
delete rules, get statistics and also has all the WIDS APs visible showing their individual antenna 
sweeps.  
 
WIDS is able to detect and defend a WLAN from the most commonly known attacks. Denial of 
Service attacks on 802.11 and 802.1 X networks are more frequently used by intruders since these 
attacks cause the most inconvenience to the WLAN with respect to basic functionality. WIDS AP’s 
are connected to the Controller through wire and when the wireless medium is acting busy due a DoS 
(deauthentication/disassociation/jamming) attack, the controller is triggered about the attack and 
recognizes that an attack is in progress. The controller then can basically shutdown the wireless 
medium. There is no defensive procedure for such DoS attacks yet but the WIDS Simulator can 
graphically show which WIDS AP’s are acting busy and the controller can collect further information 
from the various WIDS AP’s about time of attack, period the wireless medium is busy etc  
 
WIDS, is one of the few WLAN intrusion detection systems which is built with off-the-shelf 
components and also has the functionality to physically locate intruders. All that remains to 
complete a WIDS prototype is to build a WIDS AP with an embedded computer and a rotational 
antenna and to modify the WIDS HostAP software to control the movement of the antenna. 
 
Even though IEEE802.11 i improves security of wireless networks, there is still a need for additional 
security provided by WIDS. Installed wireless networks will not be immediately updated. New 
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hardware is needed for CCMP, which could be expensive for large networks. Since IEEE 802.11 i is 
new technology, there can be configuration or implementation errors. Authentication mechanisms can 
be compromised by human errors or by lost or stolen equipment. 
 
9.2. Future Research 
 
One of the main topics for future research is the development of a hardware embedded prototype of 
the WIDS APs, with moveable directional antennae accompanied with motor control. Other 
improvements would be to expand rule processing, implement combination of AND and OR logic, 
implement more rule cases and test them. 
 
The controller needs to check for access points that are down and refresh the GUI. It would be 
beneficial to implement an Agent Service that is able to perform log data clean up, send email on the 
rise of an alert etc. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
WIDS Access Point components 
 
 
Stepper Motor Controller (STP 100) 
http link : www.pontech.com/products/stp100/index.htm
Price : $159.00 
 
 
Stepper Motor (Vexta PK268-01A) 
http link : www.pontech.com/products/vexta/index.htm
Price : $99.00 
 
 
Netgate Prism Card (NL-2511 CD PLUS EXT2) 
http link : www.netgate.com/NL2511.html
Price : $75.00 
 
 
Pigtail for the wireless card to allow connection of directional antenna 
Price : $25.00 
 
 
Celestron 93499 heavy duty tripod 
http link : www.digitalfotoclub.com/products2/Celestron_Heavy_Duty_Tripod_93499.html
Price : $325.00 
 
X-Scale Single Board Computer and Wireless Networking Platform (SP-KIT400, SPB400CA, 
SDC400CA) 
http link : www.xbox.com/Products/Xscale.htm
Price : $795.00 (SP-KIT400) 
           $575.00 (SPB400CA) 
           $159.00 (SDC400CA) 
 
 
Power supply +5V/15A, +12V/4A, -12V/1A, 24V/3A Supply, stock number 14066 PS 
http link : www.powersupplydepot.com/14066-PS.htm
Price : $29.95 
 
 
Directional antenna with mounting hardware 
Price : $150.00 
 
Additional supplies, including aluminum poles for mounting directional antennas, enclosures for the 
electronics, cables, solder, and electrical connectors 
Price : $300.00 
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